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The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been suspected of carrying out a harmonising agenda
over and beyond the conventional law-interpreting function of the judiciary. In relation to the development
of a EU copyright law, the Court has seen a dramatic increase in activity, with 6 cases filed in the 10 years
following the Phil Collins case of 1992, 6 cases filed in the 5 years between 2002 and 2006, and 26 cases in
the 5 years between 2007 and 2011. This study aims to investigate empirically two theories in relation to
the development of EU copyright law: (i) that the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright
jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court
has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda (resorting to teleological interpretation of European law rather
than – less discretionary – semantic and systematic legal approaches). The findings of the study confirm the
former, and qualify the latter.
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Problematic aspects of the jurisprudence of the European Court
It is almost trite to assert the pervasive influence of the European Court of Justice on all fields of European
Law. Whether contained1 and prudent2 or innovative and activist,3 justice dispensed by the European
Court ‘elicits compliance and bolsters its authority’.4 Two integration theories dominate the field of
European political science: intergovernmental and neo-functionalist. According to the first, policy-making at
1 L. Conant, Justice Contained. Law and Politics in the European Union (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 2002),
7-10. See C. Carrubba, M. Gabel, and C. Hankla, 'Judicial Behaviour under Political Constraints: Evidence from the
European Court of Justice' (2008) 102(4) American Political Science Review 435-452, 450.
2 U. Everling, 'The Member States of the European Community before their Court of Justice', (1984) 9 ELR 215-241.
A. Bredimas, Methods of interpretation and Community Law (Oxford: North-Holland 1978), 145. For an
examination of ECJ rulings in which the Court adjusts to the will of political institutions see V. Hatzopoulos,
'Actively talking to each other: the Court and the political institutions', in E. Muir, M. Dawson and B. de Witte (eds)
Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Cheltenam: Edward Elgar 2013), 133.
3 See generally A. Stone Sweet and T. L. Brunell, 'How the European Legal System Works: Override, Non-Compliance,
and Majoritarian Activism in International Regimes' (SSRN 8 March 2011) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1780902
(last visited 13 March 2014). See also generally the first work suggesting ECJ activism: J .P. Colin, Le gouvernement
des juges dans les Communautés Européennes (Paris: M. Pinchon et R. Durand-Auzias 1965). Also generally H.
Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Copenhagen: Martinus Nijhoff 1986) and H.
Rasmussen, 'Between Activism and Self-Restraint: a judicial Policy for the European Court' (1988) 13 ELR 28-39, 34.
For a recent work indicating the limits of the teleological approach of the Court see generally G. Conway, The
Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge: CUP 2014). The author argues that the
Court’s departure from most common interpretative approaches, eg the three-stage theory by McCormick D.N.
and Summers R. in Interpreting Statutes: a Comparative Study (Dartmouth: Aldershot 1991) is not justifiable by the
originality of the EU scenario, and it suggests methods of adaptation of traditional interpretative techniques to the
ECJ case-law. See also E. Stein, 'Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution' (1981) 75(1)
American Journal of International Law 1-27, 25, arguing that the court (namely its judges and AGs) in accord with
the Commission create a constitution for Europe.
4 Conant n 1 above, 39.
the EU level is the exclusive domain of Member States which elaborate policies at intergovernmental level.
Conversely, the latter theory argues that the difficulty in reaching consensus among EU Members prompts
a ‘judicialization’ of the EU governance, whereby the Court sets legal principles that induce policy reforms,
which in turn underpin further European jurisprudence, in a virtuous circle.5 These arguments are inscribed
in the broader debate on the normative function of the Court, instrumental to European integration,
discussed already by early commentators of European law.6
Member States seem to accept the jurisprudence of the Court, willingly7 or unwillingly,8 because on the
one hand overturning its ruling requires a modification of the Treaties9 and on the other hand the Court
enjoys support by legal and political mobilization of interested parties.10 However, it has been suggested
that the Court is adopting approaches that contain its potential over-expansion.11
5 A. Stone Sweet, 'The European Court of Justice and the judicialization of EU governance', (2010) 5(2) Living
Reviews in European Governance, 7. However, others argue that the ECJ judges are sensitive to policy constraints
from Member States. This thesis has been empirically demonstrated by Carrubba et al. n 1 above.
6 R. Dehousse, La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes (Paris: Montchrestien 1997), 72.
7 J. Weiler, 'A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors', (1994) Comparative Political
Studies 510-534, 534. The author argues however that the conditions favouring this ‘easy’ acceptance of ECJ
jurisprudence are changing, and the future might bring less easy compliance with the European judicial norms. See
also Stone Sweet n 3 above, 69, arguing that the Court does so by implementing a ‘majoritarian activism’.
8 Weiler ibid, 530. The Court can achieve this result thanks to ‘prudent’ legal interpretation of EU law, which are not
openly in contrast to member states policy and are likely to be accepted by national judiciaries.
9 Stone Sweet and Brunell n 3 above, 69.
10 Conant n 1 above, 38. See also generally R. Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, Mobilization
and Governance (Cambridge: CUP 2007).
11 J. Bell, ‘The Role of European Judges in an Era of Uncertainty', in P. Birkinshaw and M. Varney (eds) The European
Legal Order after Lisbon (Austin, Boston, Chicago, New York, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2010),
289. See also F. G. Jacobs, 'The Court of Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges Ahead for the judicial
System?', in A. Rosas, A. Levits, E. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe (ebook: Asser Press
ECJ commentators are also divided between those claiming that the Court represents the interest of the
most powerful EU Member States (the Principal-Agent theory)12 and others claiming that the Court, as
many international courts, is impartial, independent, and conscious of its reputation and mandate (Trustee
rather than Agent).13 Therefore, although not immune from policy influence and pressure, it often
produces outcomes unexpected, and uncontrolled by Member States.14 It needs to be noted however that
throughout history, according to the above literature, the Court alternated bold legal innovation with
conservative and cautious interpretation of EU law. This is true both thematically and chronologically.15 In
other words, the degree of innovation introduced by the ECJ judgements varies across time and areas of
law.
All these theories, albeit to a different extent, acknowledge that the Court triggers significant changes to EU
policies, thanks to innovative legal interpretations.16 Moreover, the Court's remit witnessed a gradual
expansion, including jurisdiction on sometimes highly specialised subject-matters (for example, competition
Springer 2013), 56, advocating the self-restraint of the Court when supporting the 'green light' theory. See also
Dehousse n 6 above, 16-17, arguing in essence that the Court uses its ‘policy-making’ powers with discretion.
12 See generally G. Garrett, ' The Policy of Legal integration in the European Union' (1995]) 49(1) International
Organizations, 171-181, and G. Garrett, R. D. Kelemen, and generally H. Schulz, 'The European Court of Justice,
national governments and Legal Integration in the European Union', (1998) 52(1) International Organizations
149-176.
13 A. Stone Sweet and T. L. Brunell , ‘Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes: The Politics of
Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade
Organization’ (2013) 1(1) Journal of Law and Courts 61-88, 64.
14 K. Alter, The European Court's Political Power (Oxford: OUP 2009), 237.
15 Commentators suggest that while the Court was innovative in areas where it could count on larger mobilization of
juridical and political activism, it was more cautious on delicate areas where countries strongly claim their national
supremacy. See Dehousse n 6 above, 144, arguing that the Court adopted a lower profile since the end of the '80s,
due to a strain on integration impulses. See also Conant n 1 above, 38 for the role of activist mobilization; and on
the same topic Alter, n 14 above, 63.
16 Alter ibid, 47. The author cites the liberalization of the telecommunications as an example.
law, constitutional law, labour law, etc.) without a corresponding specialization of the Court's chambers or
judges, hence raising concerns about its credibility.17 In the field of copyright, for example, some suggest
that the rulings of the Court step in where European law leaves gaps and loopholes, and that they appear
to be motivated by a harmonising agenda which overshadow rigorous subject-specific reasoning.18 It has
also been argued that the Court builds up its own concepts of copyright law (for example the concept of
‘new public’ in relation to the right to communication to the public)19 in order to push forward their
harmonising or political agenda.20
In sum, thanks to the indeterminacy of European law, the instrument of legal interpretation in the hands of
the European judiciary transcends its traditional function. Unlike in most legal system, European law does
not provide in its texts the criteria to interpret its own legislation and norms. Directions on how the acquis
communautaire has to be construed will be drawn therefore from the jurisprudence of the Court, both
from its express guidance on interpretation and from its most current practice. An example of specific
guidelines issued by the Court is provided by the landmark case CILIFT21, where the Court stated several
principles: First, that Community legislation is drafted in several languages, all of which are authentic and
which have to be compared; Second, that Community law has its peculiar terminology; Third, that
17 J. Weiler, 'Epilogue: The Judicial Après Nice', in G. De Bùrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) The European Court of Justice
(Oxford: OUP 2001), 221.
18 Griffith for example argues that the Court does so by repeatedly referring in its rulings to the right to property
based on human rights law. See J. Griffiths, 'Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right to
property and European copyright law, (2013) 38(1) ELR 65-78, 66. See also M. van Eechoud, 'Along the Road to
Uniformity —Diverse Readings of the Court of Justice Judgments on Copyright Work' (2012) JIPITEC 1, 76. On the
same point related to general EU Law see Stone Sweet and Brunell n 3 above, 68.
See also M. Leistner, 'Europe’s copyright law decade: Recent case law of the European Court of Justice and policy
perspectives' (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 2, 559–600.
20 C. Kaupa, 'Maybe not activist enough? On the court's alleged neoliberal bias in its recent labour cases', in Muir,
Dawson and de Witte (eds) Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013), 74.
21 Case 283/81 CILIFT [1982] ECR 3415 (17-20).
provisions of European law need to be put in context and interpreted according to the purpose of
community law as a whole.22
Common interpretative practices of the Court as reported by the literature involve the use of traditional
legal topoi, generally classified as semantic, contextual and teleological, with the addition of peculiar
canons specific to the EU (effet utile, proportionality principle, uniform application, etc.). While some
studies on European jurisprudence detect an arbitrary imbalance in the weight assigned to such topoi, with
a favour for teleological canons instead of semantic interpretations,23 other researchers provide a different
picture. Bengoetxea and Beck for example, in their respective works, affirm that semantic arguments are
preferred by the Court whenever the text of the law is clear, detailed, and univocal (especially in different
translations). In essence, if the Court appears to give to semantic arguments less weight than most high
courts, it is because of the inherent ambiguity of European law.24
When the letter of the law does not offer sufficient guidance, systematic arguments and teleological
arguments are called into play. Bengoetxea argues that systematic criteria are preferred to a combination
of systematic and teleological criteria,25 while Beck finds that the Court makes large use of its discretion
and flexibility (compared to national high courts) in order to implement a cumulative approach, which is
used to justify its ruling. These rulings, according to Beck, are in fact prompted by ‘steadying factors’, such
22 See A. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (Oxford: OUP 2006), 608. Also Bengoetxea n 24 above,
232.
23 See above, Section 1.
24 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon. The legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice: towards a European jurisprudence
(Oxford : New York : Clarendon 1993) ; Gunnar Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2012).
The ambiguity of European law is produced by the nature of the legal instrument at hand (directives often provide
mere legal frameworks rather than defined norms) and by the multicultural nature of European legislators. See
Beck n 24 above, 190.
25 Bengoetxea n 24 above, 233-234.
as ‘national political and budgetary sensitivities’.26 This however does not suggest that the Court assumes
the role of legislator and departs from the letter of the law, if this can be avoided. There is no evidence of
an overly innovative or purposive approach of the Court in the interpretation of European law, apart from
the extent that it is prompted by the legal uncertainty of the text. On the contrary, no clear path or
direction seems to emerge from an analysis of the European jurisprudence. Thus, the rulings of the Court
cannot be anticipated, to the detriment of legal certainty.27
In sum, problematic issues regarding the approach of the ECJ in interpreting and applying European law
are: a) the Court is said to over-use of teleological/dynamic interpretation in order to carry out its
harmonising agenda; b) the rulings of the Court do not reveal a consistent and foreseeable pattern, apart
from the consolidation of European law; c) the above issues are particularly evident in subject-specific
areas, where the Court relinquish specialist doctrine in favour of a European agenda.
However, these assumptions have not been supported by empirical evidence; a gap that the present study
will address.
Methodological approach
Previous systematic empirical research on the ECJ utilizes qualitative and quantitative methods to explore
the influence of the Court on the EU policy-making. These studies are based either on a chronological
selection of cases28 or on a diachronic sectorial selection.29 Mostly the coding of the ECJ case-law aimed to
26 Beck n 24 above, 233.
27 Beck argues the lack of ‘reckonability’ of European judgements, ibid, 233.
28 Carrubba et al. n 1 above.
29 A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford: OUP 2004). R. Cichowski,. ‘Integrating the
Environment: The European Court and the Construction of Supranational Policy’ (1998) 5(3) Journal of European
Public Policy 387-405. R. Cichowski, ‘Women’s Rights, the European Court, and Supranational Constitutionalism’
(2004) 38(3) Law and Society Review 489-512. R. Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation,
examine the impact of the observations of Member States and EU institutions (e.g. the EU Commission) on
the conclusions of the Advocate General and on the judgement.
Other classic legal research (or legal philosophy research) examines the judicial decision-making process of
the Court30 by analysing a number of judicial decisions as case studies, in search of specific patterns in the
Court’s approaches. These studies are carried out either on the whole body of European jurisprudence or
on subject-specific areas. As an example of the latter, Griffith and van Eechoud respectively have stressed
the incoherence of the Court in relation to copyright matters and its creativity in justifying reasoning aimed
mainly at further European integration.31
With a focus on copyright case law, our study aims at providing empirical evidence on the problematic
issues mentioned above. Our sample is defined by all cases that are the result of preliminary references to
the Court which refer in the Application and in the Ground of Judgement to one of the directives of the
acquis communautaire on the subject-matter of copyright and related rights. These criteria render
forty-nine cases in total between 1992 and February 2014, of which forty cases refer to copyright, related
rights and software protection,32 and nine cases relate to database rights.33 The documents analysed
Mobilization and Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007). M. McCown, ‘The European
Parliament before the Bench: ECJ precedent and European Parliament Litigation Strategies’ (2003) 10(6) Journal of
European Public Policy 974-995. S. Nyikos, ‘ The Preliminary Reference Process: National Court Implementation,
Changing Opportunity Structures and Litigant Desistment’ (2003) 4(4) European Union Politics 397-419.
30 J. Bengoetxea, N. McCormick and L. Moral Soriano, 'Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the
European Court of Justice', in G. De Bùrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) The European Court of Justice (Oxford: OUP
2001), 43.
31 n 18 above.
32 Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related
rights in the information society, OJ L 167, 22.06.2001 P. 10 – 19; Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November
1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property,
OJ L 346, 27.11.1992, p. 61–66. Directive 92/100/EEC has been repealed and replaced by Directive 2006/115/EC,
without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States relating to the time-limits for transposition into national
consist of the Opinions of the Advocate General (AG) and the Grounds for Judgement (including the
Operational Part of the Judgement) of each case.
Following previous European34 and American35 models, the paper first employs descriptive statistics to
track down the route of specialist subject-matter within the Court (case assignment, chamber, judges). It
law of the Directives; Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission,
OJ L 248, 6.10.1993, p. 15–21; Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art, OJ L 272, 13.10.2001, p.
32–36; Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and
certain related rights, OJ L 290, 24.11.1993, p. 9–13. Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 372,
27.12.2006, p. 12-18; Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
certain permitted uses of orphan works OJ L 299, 27.10.2012, p. 5-12; Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May
1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 122, 17.05.1991 p. 42 – 46. Directive 2009/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 111,
05.05.2009, p. 16 -22; Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on
the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access, OJ L 320, 1998-11-28, pp. 54–57;
Directives on the protection of semiconductor topographies (87/54/EC, 94/824/EC, 96/644/EC); Directive
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual
property rights OJ L 195/16, 02.06.2004, p. 16-25.
33 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of
databases OJ L 077, 27/03/1996 P. 0020 – 0028.
34 n 29 above.
35 M. A. Hall and R. F. Wright, ‘Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions’, Wake Forest Univ. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 913336, 2006 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913336 (last visited
23 March 2014) ; Fred Kort, Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law, in Judicial Decision-making 133
(Glendon Schubert, ed. 1963); R. C. Lawlor, ‘Fact Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions’, 8 Jurimetrics J. 107, 110
(1968); B. Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions’, (2008) 156 Pennsylvania Law Review
subsequently maps the legal background of the members of the European Court of Justice in search of
relationships between subject-specific skills and the assignment of cases. Further, it applies qualitative
content analysis to measure the recourse to certain legal approaches in the sampled cases, which are
coded in variables that are in turn object of statistical computation and multiple regression analysis. The
dependent variable is represented by the outcome of the case (the impact on the rights of the copyright
owner) and the explanatory variables are represented by the legal approaches implemented by the Court.
Finally, the identified legal approaches are linked to court members and subject subareas (database,
software), in order to identify causal relationships. The aim of the article is not an assessment of the
substantive law, but rather an identification of predominant legal interpretative canons within the Court
and their impact on the decision-making process. A better empirical understanding how European
jurisprudence is created and shaped will contribute to identifying dysfunctions and loopholes that need to
be addressed by prospective institutional reforms of the European Court of Justice.
Rules of procedure and lines of reform
The procedure of preliminary ruling is prompted by a reference from a national court of an EU Member
State. The national court requires from the ECJ the interpretation of a point of European Law, which might
indirectly involve the infringement of EU law by the Member State.36 The reference is lodged with the
Registrar's Office, which deals with the translation of the full text of the reference into the EU official
languages. The Registrar also defines the category within which the case should be classified (e.g. the legal
549; B. Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement’, (2006) 95 California Law
Review 1581; M. Sag, ‘Predicting Fair Use’ (2012) 73(1) Ohio State Law Journal 47-91.
36 For direct infringement a Breach Proceedings is brought by the Commission against the allegedly infringing
Member State. These procedures are out of the scope of this work.
subject-matter, as for example ‘social security' or ‘citizenship’ etc.).37 The case is then transferred to the
President of the Court and to the First Advocate General.
Further, the President of the Court assigns the case to a chamber, and appoints a Reporting Judge within
this chamber, whereas the First Advocate General assigns the case to an Advocate General. According to
the procedural rules of the Court, no particular order, as for example a rotation order, is provided for the
assignment of a case to a particular chamber. The only rule established by the procedure in terms of case
assignment provides that particularly important cases can be judged by Court in its formation as Grand
Chamber.38
The case assignment to the Reporting Judge and to the AG is made as well without specific procedural rules
(e.g. there is no rotation among Court members). However, it is frequent that the same judges and the
same AGs are responsible for cases relating to similar subject-matter.39 Usually the AG to whom a case is
37 The issue of categorization is not as trivial as it might seem. Defining a case as belonging to a subject matter can
determine for example whether Member State decide to intervene in the process (by making observations). See
Bengoetxea, McCornick and Moral Soriano, n 30 above, 52.
38 Article 60 Rules of Proceedings of the ECJ: ‘Assignment of cases to formations of the Court:
1. The Court shall assign to the Chambers of five and of three Judges any case brought before it in so far as the
difficulty or importance of the case or particular circumstances are not such as to require that it should be assigned
to the Grand Chamber, unless a Member State or an institution of the European Union participating in the
proceedings has requested that the case be assigned to the Grand Chamber, pursuant to the third paragraph of
Article 16 of the Statute.
2. The Court shall sit as a full Court where cases are brought before it pursuant to the provisions referred to in the
fourth paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute. It may assign a case to the full Court where, in accordance with the
fifth paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute, it considers that the case is of exceptional importance.’ See the Rules of
Procedure of the Court Of Justice, L 265/1 Official Journal of the European Union, 29.9.2012, available at
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:265:0001:0042:EN:PDF >
39 T. Tridimas, 'The role of the Advocate General in the development of Community Law: some reflections', (1997-12)
34(6) Common Market Law Review 1349-1387, 1355. See N. Burrows and R. Greaves, The Advocate General and EC
assigned does not belong to the Member State involved in the litigation, or to the Member State of one of
the parties in the case of a preliminary ruling.40 However, this unwritten rule is not always followed.41
After the parties have filed their submissions, the Reporting Judge writes a preliminary report, to be
presented at the Court general meeting,42 in which a summary of the case is made. The summary includes
the main fact situation, the norms potentially applicable, and previous referable case law. The Reporting
Judge might also indicate points of national law that need further clarifications or even details of the fact
situation that would need further measures of inquiry. He or she can suggest to which formation of the
Court the case should be assigned and whether to dispense with the hearing or the opinion of the AG.43
Once the case has been presented to the general meeting, the written part of the procedure can start.
Written submissions such as statements of case, defences, and observations by the parties and by any
intervener (for example, interested Member States and the EU Commission) are received by the Registrar
and circulated among the panellist judges and the AG. The submissions are accompanied, where possible,
by the relevant documentary evidence. After the conclusion of the written part, a date for the hearing is
fixed.
Before the hearing, if there is any, a report on the case written by the Reporting Judge is circulated among
the parties and the judges. At the hearing, the pleadings of the parties and any observation by interveners
are heard by the panel of judges that forms the chamber. If a supplement of inquiry is necessary, also
witnesses and experts are heard by the Court. In the procedure for preliminary ruling there is no
Law (Oxford: OUP 2007), 23.
40 Burrows and Greaves ibid, 23.
41 Tridimas n 39 above, 1356.
42 Article 59 of the Court Rules of Proceedings. The meeting is normally held on Tuesdays afternoon. See Burrows and
Greaves n 39 above, 24.
43 According to Article 20 (formerly Art.18) of the Statutes of the ECJ, as modified by the Nice treaty, ‘ [...] Where it
considers that the case raises no new point of law, the Court may decide, after hearing the Advocate General, that
the case shall be determined without a submission from the Advocate General’.
opportunity for the parties to reply in writing to the introductory statements of their adversary, therefore
they respond to their argument at the hearing.44
After the parties have exposed their arguments, at a request of the president of the chamber, the
Reporting Judge and the AG can ask clarifications to the speakers. Finally, the Advocate General can issue
his or her Opinion, but more often a date is announced for an opinion to be issued, around a month later.45
In the Opinion, the AG exposes thoroughly any doctrinal and jurisprudential arguments underpinning her
proposed solution of the case. Alternative draft opinions can also be submitted by the AG to the Court,
supporting different arguments.46 After the reading of the conclusions of the Opinion of the AG, the oral
procedure is officially closed. However, the hearing can be reopened, after the submission of the AG, if
further measures of inquiry are required.47
Before the deliberation, the Reporting Judge circulates a note to the other judges to suggest a draft ruling
for the case. In this note she will state her agreement or disagreement with the opinion of the Advocate
general. Any dissenting judge will normally circulate another note to express her views. If there is clear
disagreement on a case within the Court, a meeting would be normally set to discuss the matter. Dissenting
opinions of any member of the panel are not cited in the judgement. Normally, the Opinion of the AG is not
cited in detail within the judgement either. If the ruling disagrees with the opinion of the AG, it elaborates
its own legal reasoning. In alternative, when the judges agree with the Opinion, they refer to it in full or in
part, often without restating the arguments expressed therein.48
The AG, in her Opinion, analyses previous Court case law on the same issue and, if necessary, points out
discrepancies and inconsistencies of the Court's previous legal reasoning. A comparative analysis of
44 Burrows and Graves n 39above, 27.
45 ibid.
46 Tridimas n 39 above, 1360.
47 Burrows and Graves n 39 above, 28.
48 ibid.
Member States legislation can also be included in the Opinion in order to support the arguments of the
AG.49 Overall, the opinion of the Advocate General provides the most detailed and exhaustive analysis of
the case, and it is often much more voluminous than the ruling. On the one hand this is a guarantee of the
doctrinal rigour with which a case is analysed before the Court, on the other hand this involves substantial
costs both in terms of time and resources, especially due to the growing number of the official languages of
the EU, in which the Opinion has to be translated. Prompted by these concerns, some arguments have
been made for a redundancy of the role of the Advocate General within the Court.50
In 2011, the Court proposed urgent modifications to reform the ECJ statutes to cope with the dramatic
backlog in its case-load,51 which is expected to further increase due to EU enlargement.52 However, in
2012, very few modifications were introduced by EU Regulation to the Statutes of the European Court of
Justice.53
The modifications to the Court Statutes include for example the appointment of a vice-president of the
General Court, who can relieve the president from part of his increasingly demanding tasks,54 the increase
49 Tridimas n 39 above, 1360.
50 Burrows and Graves n 39 above, 297.
51 The Court referred an increase of 65 per cent of the cases pending between 2000 and 2010. See the summary of
the proposed legislation at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1148372&t=e&l=en (last
visited 12 March 2014).
52 Although hitherto the substantial increase in workload due to the EU enlargement did not quite take place. See D.
Tamm,' The History of the court of Justice of the European Union since its Origin', in A. Rosas, Levits, E. Bot (eds)
The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe (eBook: Asser Press Springer 2013), 21. P. Craig, 'The
Jurisdiction of the Community Court Reconsidered', in G. De Bùrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) The European Court of
Justice (OUP 2001), 183.
53 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 741/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 August 2012
amending the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Annex I thereto, OJ L 228,
23.8.2012, p. 1–3.
54 ibid, Article 1(1).
of the number of the judges that may sit in the Grand Chamber, and the elimination of the obligation for
the presidents of the Chambers to sit in the Grand Chamber. This latter modification aims at allowing all
judges to participate to the sitting of the Grand Chamber.55 Another modification included the possibility
to appoint temporary judges to cover for members of the Civil Service Tribunal prevented on medical
ground from performing their duties.
Specialized courts for intellectual property cases, the creation of which is object of discussion since the
Treaty of Nice56 have not been introduced in the present reform although the Court had requested to
increase the number of judges of the General Court and the formation of specialised chambers.
In the explanatory note to the proposal of amendment of the ECJ Statutes, the Court specified that two
routes to reform were available by the Treaties in order to face the increasing workload of the ECJ:
increasing the number of the judges of the General Court or establishing specialised courts. The Court
suggested increasing the number of the judges of the General Court to 39, motivating this decision with the
argument that specialised courts would be helpful to face the increased workload only after a relevant
amount of time.57 Increasing the number of judges to the General Court would instead provide for a
quicker solution.
In its opinion to the legislative proposal of modification of the ECJ statutes, the Commission fully supported
the request of the Court. It agreed with the proposal of increasing the number of judges and it specified
that the General Court would however retain the power of organising its formation as appropriate. It
therefore could form two or more specialised chambers to handle specific subject-matter.58 However, the
55 ibid, Article 1(3).
56 N. Lavranos, ‘The new specialised courts within the European judicial system’, (2005) 30(2) E.L. Rev. 261-272, 261.
57 Proposed amendments to the Statutes of the ECJ and explanatory note, 9, at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-04/projet_en.pdf (last visited 25 January 2014).
58 The Commission suggested the formation of ‘at least two’ specialized chambers. See the Commission Opinion of
30.9.2011 on the requests for the amendment of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union,
EU Regulation addressing the reform of the Statutes incorporated only part of the requests of the Court.
The reform included the appointment of a vice-president to the Court, the increase of the components of
the Grand Chamber (and its quorum), and the appointment of temporary judges to cover for the absences
in the Civil Service Tribunal. But the number of the members of the General Court remained unchanged.
Relevant reforms in this sense were referred in the text of the Regulation to ‘a later stage’.59
Other reforms largely discussed by EU scholars such as the decentralization of the Court of Justice,60 a
different distribution of the competences between the General Tribunal and the ECJ,61 and the different
rules of appointment of EU judges62 have not been considered by the recent reform.
Copyright cases assignment
The sample analysed by our study includes all closed cases referring to one of the directives forming the
aquis communeautaire relating to copyright63 that are object of a preliminary reference before the ECJ at
the date of March 2014. This dataset allows us to investigate the pattern of case allocation among ECJ
chambers in the matter of copyright. Since the ECJ does not have specialised sections, in practice the
President of the Court, after the preliminary report of the Reporting Judge, allocates the case to a chamber.
presented by the Court, Brussels, 30.9.2011 COM(2011) 596 final, 5.
59 Recital 7 of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 741/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 August
2012 amending the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Annex I thereto, OJ L
228, 23.8.2012, p. 1–3.
60 G. C. Rodriguez Iglasias, 'Levolution de l'architecture jurisdictionnelle de l'Union Européenne', in A. Rosas, E. Levits,
Y. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe (eBook: Asser Press Springer 2013), 46.
61 Weiler n 17 above, 222; Craig n 52 above, 193.
62 Arnull, n 22 above, 522.
63 n 32 above.
The criteria of this assignment are unclear, as they are not provided by the rules of procedure of the
Court.64
Before the year 1998 preliminary rulings were not assigned to chambers, therefore our sample reveals
interesting insights only from this year onwards. The data shows an unmistakable predominance of the
third and fourth chambers of the Court, followed by a relevant share of cases assigned to the Grand
Chamber and only few cases assigned to the other chambers. When these figures are broken down by year
of registration, the data show a slow raise of the third and fourth chambers, alternatively, as a recipient of
copyright cases. In the period going from the year 2008 and culminating in the year 2011, the third
chamber slowly gained the monopoly of copyright litigation, only to leave the place to the fourth chamber
in the following years.
The review of case allocation among chambers of the ECJ prompted an investigation on the identity of the
judges sitting in the panels, in order to understand whether the choice of the chamber could correspond to
the choice of a judge. The data show nine judges representing more than 80 per cent of the total presences
in Court ruling on copyright cases. These judges are mostly part of the third and the fourth chambers of the
ECJ. This suggests that the chambers were chosen on the basis of the composition of the panel, presumably
because of a particular expertise in the subject-specific area.
A substantial share of cases however were referred to the Grand Chamber, which is called into action
whenever a case is particularly complex. Our findings need to take into account the specific procedural
rules according to which the Grand Chamber is formed. Panellists of Grand Chambers for example have to
include the presidents of the other Chambers, irrespective of their background or experience. Keeping into
account the potential distorting effects produced by these procedural rules the data show a predominance
of the same selection of judges in both Court formations (Grand Chamber or other Chamber).
64 ibid.
Further, the recurrence of Reporting Judges and of Advocate Generals (AGs) has also been calculated. In
this respect, the prevalence of a restricted number of names is far more evident. Judge J. Malenovský
registers an overwhelming majority of presences as Judge Rapporteur in the cases of the sample, followed
at a large distance by Judge G. Arestis, and by Judge K. Lenaerts. The remaining judges have a number of
presences inferior to three per cent.
Moreover, a subject-matter specific analysis reveals that judge Malenovský is the reporting judge in most
cases on copyright and related rights since the year of his appointment (2004), whereas before this date
this role was covered by judge Puissochet. On database rights, Judge Lenaertz is the Reporting Judge in
almost all cases. Only three cases of our sample related to software protection. Two of them were assigned
to Judge Arestis. A clear relationship therefore seems to emerge between specific judges and specific
sub-areas of copyright law. However, since the year 2012 copyright cases tend to be assigned to members
of the fourth chamber other than Malenovský. A possible explanation for this apparent change of policy
could be provided by the remarkable increase in the copyright-related workload of the Court.
The analysis yields less extreme results with relation to the presence of specific Advocate Generals in the
examined case-law. However, a pattern emerges also in this case. In the area of copyright law, two AGs
show a number of presences notably higher to that of others: V. Trstenjak and E Sharpston. In the area of
software, although the size of the sample is rather limited, AG Bot is assigned to all cases. Finally, in the
area of the database right, despite an apparent prevalence of AG Stix-Hackl, the distribution among AGs is
more balanced.65
65 AG Stix-Hackl in fact appears to have the highest share of cases, but this is a false positive, as the four cases
assigned to her are in fact four parallel cases regarding the same factual situation (C-444/02 Fixtures Marketing
[2004] ECR I-10549, C-338/02 Fixtures Marketing [2004] ECR I-10497, C-203/02 The British Horseracing Board e.a.
[2004] ECR I-10415, C-46/02 Fixtures Marketing [2004] ECR I-10365).
ECJ copyright and database cases (1992-2014) by Judge Rapporteur and Advocate General
Figure 1
The data above shows a clear predominance of specific members of the ECJ in copyright and database
cases, in what appears to be a traditional unwritten operational code of the Court, which tends to assign
cases by subject matter, enabling the development of specific expertise.66 In this sense, judge Malenovský
seems to have taken the place of the famous Advocate General Francis Jacobs, who influenced European
intellectual property law with his opinions in landmark cases.67 Just as Jacobs, Malenovský has a
background in European Law, without a specialization in Intellectual Property Law. His experience in
copyright matters seems to derive from the practice before the Court. This is in line with the tradition of
the CJEU where members have a generalist background, because they are expected to examine a wide
array of subject-matters.68
66 A first-generation of intellectual property cases before the Court shows the prevalence of Advocate General
Francis Jacobs and Reporting Judge Claus Christian Gulman (in turn, he was previously Advocate General before
the Court and he had issued opinions on landmark intellectual property cases). See Burrows and Greaves n 39
above, 128.
67 ibid, 157-165.
68 ibid, 297.
A cross comparison between chamber assignment and member assignment confirms the above
observations. Copyright cases assigned to the Fourth Chamber coincide with cases assigned to Judge
Malenovský, who was assigned to both the Third and the Fourth Chambers. After Malenovský, a much
lower recurrence of presences can be registered by Judges Arestis and Lenaertz, also from the Third and
Fourth Chamber, more often though sitting when the Court was in Grand Chamber formation. A marginal
share of copyright cases is assigned to the Second, Fifth and Sixth Chamber. Incidentally, it is worth noting
that one of these cases has been severely criticised, referring to the composition of the Court and to its
‘lack of experience’.69
The members of the ECJ
Members of the European Court of Justice (judges and Advocates General), according to European Law,
must be appointed by a ‘common accord of the governments of Member States.’70 However, since its
inception the practice of the recruitment of the Court involved individual Member States appointing ‘their’
judges without any interference from the others.71 Necessary experience and qualifications for the
appointment of a member to the Court of Justice of the European Union (including all courts) are only
broadly specified.
Article 253 of the Treaty of the European Union provides that candidates to the European Court of Justice
should be ‘persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications for
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisprudents of
69 L. Bently, 'The return of industrial copyright?' (2012) 34(10) EIPR 654-672, 663.
70 Lisbon Treaty, Article 19 available http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655-re07.en08.pdf (last
visited 28 November 2013).
71 F. G. Jacobs, 'The Court of Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges Ahead for the judicial System?', in Rosas,
A. Levits, E. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe (eBook: Asser Press Springer 2013) , 58.
See also Dehousse n 6 above, 12.
recognised competence’. Article 254 instead requires candidates to the General Court to be ‘persons whose
independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to judicial office’.72
However, according to the Judges’ Charter in Europe (1993) of the European Association of Judges, the
selection of the judges should be based ‘on objective criteria designed to ensure professional competence.
Selection must be performed by an independent body which represents the Judges. No outside influence
and, in particular, no political influence must play any part in the appointment of Judges’.73
The procedure of appointment of the members of the Court, therefore, departs from the most common
procedures implemented in national jurisdictions, which are based either on a public competition, under
the supervision of a magistracy body, or on public elections. This peculiar procedure for the appointment of
European judges inspired concerns relating to the independence of the Court.74 In fact, the first historic
accounts of the ECJ composition report that no judge or advocate general was appointed to the Court
without being very close to the political establishment that selected him75 (or her, although we have to
wait till 1990 to see the first female judge of the Court76). Moreover, despite academic concerns,77 court
members are appointed for six years, and their mandate is freely renewable by Member States. This
72 The text of the Treaty (Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union) is available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655-re07.en08.pdf (last visited 28 November 2013).
73 Available online at http://www.richtervereinigung.at/international/eurojus1/eurojus15a.htm (last visited 23
October 2013).
74 See Rasmussen n 3 above, 34.
75 See generally Nicole Condorelli Braun, Commissaires et juges dans le communeautés européennes (Paris: Pichon et
Durand-Auzias 1972. This finding was confirmed by following research. See Dehousse n 6 above, 12.
76 This was Fidelma O' Kelly Macken, althought Simone Rozès had already been appointed as Advocate General in
1981. See Tamm n 52 above, 20.
77 The EU Parliament proposal to extend the mandate of the judges to 10 years, not renewable, was rejected. Some
commentators suggest that this is a clear sign that Member States do not intend to renounce their power of
pressure on the Members of the Court. See Dehousse n 6 above, 18.
represents an obvious tool of pressure on the judge by the Member State, which is only partially balanced
by the procedure providing for collegial decisions and confidentiality of dissenting opinions.78
The gradual expansion of the Court, both in terms of members and competences, fuelled the debate
around its judicial independence, hence calling for reform of the appointment process.79 A special
committee was therefore created by the Article 255 of the Lisbon Treaty (2009).80 This panel of seven
members, appointed by the Council for four years, is formed by former members of the ECJ, juridical
figures of the highest quality, and one member proposed by the EU Parliament. The committee examines
the candidatures of new members as well as membership renewals, and issues a non-binding confidential
opinion to the appointing Member State.81 Effects of the activity of this committee on the independence of
court members would need to be measured by further research, in due course.82 Meanwhile, critics of this
institution suggest that improvements should be made in order to enhance the impact of the committee on
the impartiality of the judges.83
78 Dehousse n 6 above, 15. Minority opinions in fact are not published in judgements, in order to preserve the
independence of the judge, especially vis-à-vis the member state that has appointed them. Arnull 2006 n 45 above,
11.
79 The European Parliament has proposed repeatedly to expand the term of judges’ appointment but to make it
non-renewable, in order to guarantee their independence. But the proposal has never been accepted. See Weiler
2001 n 17 at 225; and Arnull n 22 above, at 22.
80 Text of the Treaty (consolidated) at <
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655-re07.en08.pdf>.
81 The committee is referred in practice as 'le comité 255'. See generally J.M. Sauvé, 'Le role du comité 255 dans la
sélection du Juge de l'Union', in Rosas, A. Levits, E. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe
(eBook: Asser Press Springer 2013).
82 The committee is active since the year 2010, and although it has already examined 35 between new memberships
and renewals, further jurisprudential production is needed to carry out significant research.
83 Arnull for example suggests that the ‘committee 255’ could choose from a list of three candidates, as it is currently
done for the appointment of ECHR judges. See Arnull n 22 above at 25. In fact, many of the problems that have
The professional background of the members of the European Court of Justice has been object of a limited
body of research. Nicole Condorelli Braun for example carried out one of the first analyses of the
background of the members of the Court from its establishment until the beginning of 1970. She explored
in detail the biography of the -then- few judges of the European Court and reported anecdotal evidence of
their political connections as well as their recruitment.84 More recently, Antonin Cohen85 and Sally
Kenney86 have examined the background of the members of the Court with a focus on their professional
experience and background, as well as their career provenance.87 All the above studies substantially
present a scenario with court member that are mainly academics in the area of community, comparative or
international law, often in addition to being high members of the judiciary and high officials (or
consultants) in their respective governments.
Further, Kenney enlarged the scope of her studies by including the staff of the Cabinet of each judge or
Advocate General. Each member of the ECJ has three ‘référendaires’ (legal clerks, or secretaries) who help
with members' ordinary functions. Kenney's research focussed on the background of these important and
yet overlooked employees of the Court, by analysing their rules of appointments and their previous and
been identified regarding the appointment process of judges at the ECHR are applicable to ECJ judges as well. See
Interight Report 'Judicial Independence: Law and Practice of appointments to the ECHR, available at
<http://www.interights.org/jud-ind-en/index.html > (last visited 23-10-13).
84 Condorelli Braun n 75 above.
85 A. Cohen, 'Sous la robe du juge: le recrutement social de la Cour', in Pascal Mbongo and Antoine Vauchez (eds)
Dans la fabrique du droit européen. Scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de justice des Communeautés
européennes (Bruylant 2009). See also Antonin Cohen, 'The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and Clerks
in the Writing of Europe', European University Institute Working Papers, at
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/10029 (last accessed 12 February 2014).
86 See generally S. Kenney, 'The members of the Court of Justice of the European Communities', (1998) 5 Columbia
Journal of European Law 101-133
87 ibid, 107.
subsequent careers.88 Vauchez as well examined the background of the référendaires, suggesting that their
career path is by and large similar to that of the judges, in that it combines profiles coming from academia,
magistracy, legal practice, and public administration.89 Kenney suggests that European legal clerks do not
displace the power of the judge, as they do in other legal systems:90 the member always supervises the
work and is aware of the content of the legal deeds produced by the Cabinet. However, she also speculates
that members of the ECJ might become more dependent on staff as the workload of the Court increases.91
Antonin Cohen's research includes Courts members in post until the year 1999. He identifies three periods
in the distribution of the background of the judges of the ECJ. These are: a) From 1952 to 1972; b) From
1973 to 1985; and c) From 1986 to1999. These periods coincide with the general evolution of the Court,
following successive enlargements of the EU. Cohen reports that at its outset (1958) the Court was
composed mostly by academics, specialised in international law, while a smaller portion was represented
by high-ranking judges92. These academics however had always some connection with the government of
the appointing Member State. Their background was therefore mixed, political and technical, the technical
88 See generally S. Kenney, 'Beyond Principals And Agents, Seeing Courts as Organizations by Comparing
Référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court', (2000) 33(5)
Comparative Political Studies 593-625.
89 Among the 105 law clerks (référendaires) recruited between 1997 and 2001 by the Cabinets of the members of the
ECJ, 28 were coming from the Court, 21 were academics, 16 were lawyers, 13 were coming from the national
magistracy and 16 from the Public Administration. Moreover, 10 had been in post in an European institution and
one was coming from his national Chamber of Commerce . See A. Vauchez, 'Conclusion: le magistère de la Cour', in
Pascal Mbongo and Antoine Vauchez (eds) Dans la fabrique du droit européen. Scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour
de justice des Communeautés européennes (Brusseles : Bruylant 2009), 235.
90 Kelly compares the ECJ with the US Supreme Court. See Kelley n 89 above, 603 .
91 Kenney n 89 above, 620.
92 Cohen n 85 above, 20. It has been suggested that this atypical source of recruitment for the Court has had an
influence on the way it performed its duties. See Dehousse n 6 above, 13.
part being mostly focused on administrative law and civil law, which at the time provided most of the tools
necessary to understand and interpret European law.93
In the second period, members of the ECJ were increasingly coming from the ranks of the national
magistracy and from the public administration, whereas the thirds period, according to Cohen, registered a
further increase of the presence of academics. He argues that this has to be put in relation with the EU
enlargement to southern European countries such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal. These countries, similarly
to Italy, tend to appoint academics as members of the Court, whereas other EU Member Founders such as
France and Germany tend to privilege appointments of previous judges and public servants.94 At the same
time, this third period witnesses a decrease in the number of judges coming from posts in the public
administration of their country of origin.95
The relevant presence of academics among the Court's members is further confirmed by other research on
the background of the ECJ judges. Scheeck for example reports that in 2006, among the twenty-five judges
and eight AGs in post at the time, sixteen had a PhD in Law and twenty-one were or had been professional
academics.96
As for the provenance of the member of the Court, Cohen notes a certain 'circulation' among international
courts such as the High Authority, the International Court of Justice, and the European Court of Justice97
Moreover, his research shows that some of the judges had participated, mostly informally, in the
93 Condorelli Braun n 75 above, 63.
94 Cohen n 85 above, 27-28.
95 Ibid, 28.
96 L. Scheeck, 'La diplomatie commune des Cours européennes', in Pascal Mbongo and Antoine Vauchez (eds) Dans la
fabrique du droit européen. Scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de justice des Communeautés européennes
(Bruylant 2009), 210.
97 The term European Court of Justice (ECJ) here include the Court in all its former and present denominations: Court
of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community, Court of Justice of the European Community, and Court of
Justice of the European Union. Cohen n 85 above, 20-21.
negotiation of the European Treaties,98 and several of them practised before the Court before becoming a
member.99 The 'circulation' within the Court, intended as recruitment from the ranks of AGs and legal
clerks (référendaires), according to Cohen has substantially increased in the third period, while it was
virtually non-existent in the previous two.100
Both Kenney's and Cohen's studies reveal very interesting details about the composition of the Court of
Justice. However, the time-frame of these studies ends before substantial EU enlargements.101 A more
recent analysis of the court composition could reveal a different scenario, prompted by the increased
number of the Court members and of the competences of the Court. Although our study focus on copyright
case-law as a case study, we examined the profile of forty-five members of the ECJ, since we included in our
sample also judges sitting in the Grand Chamber. Thus, in effect our study covers most members (judges
and Advocate Generals) of the ECJ.
Our analysis shows a remarkable prevalence of EU Law and Public Law in the professional background of
the members of the Court. A large majority has performed studies or held academic positions in the fields
of: European Union (or Community) Law, Public Administration Law, Public International Law, or Public
European Law. A background in Constitutional Law and Human Rights is also relatively common among ECJ
members, also because many of them come from a post in their national Constitutional Court or a in the
European Court of Human Rights.102 Minority specializations, in relative terms, include Civil Law, Criminal
Law, Political Science, and Trade Law, followed by International Private Law (Conflict of Laws), Comparative
Law, and Law and Economics. The smallest percentage in turn is represented by specialists in Family Law,
Tax Law, Competition Law, and Business Law.
98 However, this figure is low in comparison to the number of judges of the High Authority that participated to
drafting and negotiation of the Treaties. ibid, 22-23.
99 ibid, 23.
100 ibid, 28.
101 From 2004 to 2013 twelve new countries joined the EU, thus bringing the total number of Member States to 28.
102 See below, in the same section.
Most of the ECJ members, as expected, have composite careers, featuring academic positions alongside
juridical professions and governmental posts. We have stratified the sample in four main profiles, which
seem to remain the leading careers of the members of the European Court since its inception:103 a)
Academics; b) Judiciary; c) Lawyers (including public prosecutors); d) Public Administration (including
consultancy appointments). First we have calculated the recurrence of each of the above profiles in the
career of each member, therefore including several profiles in each career. Secondly we have attempted to
identify the prevailing profile in each career, in order to compute each member for his main professional
background. We also have considered the economic expertise of each member,104 and their provenance
from another international or European institution.
The analysis indicates that the majority of ECJ members have held academic posts at some stage in their
career. Most of these members are university professors, but some are part-time lecturer or researchers in
addition to their main career, which is not in academia. The majority of the members have also held posts
within their home public administration, often as a consultant of the government, but mainly as a civil
servant for some ministry or public institution. A similar share of the sample has occupied a post in another
international institution before being appointed to the Court. The European Court of Human Rights seems
to be the main provider of members of the ECJ. However, a substantial share of the members comes from
the Court itself, as previous judges of the General Court, or legal clerks (référendaires) at the ECJ or
Advocates General. Some other members come from EU institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament),
or from delegations to the EU institutions, or from advisory bodies to the EU institutions. One member
comes from a European agency (Europol).
103 Previous literature did not analyse separately the skills of the members. However, the comparison with their
findings relating to the main career of each member reveals by and large the same proportions among the Court's
main profiles (academics, judges and administrators). See Cohen n 85 above, 22-23 and Kelley n 86 above, 107.
104 In addition to an expertise in Law and Economics, indicated in the previous paragraph, the data revealed the
presence of an economic component in the examined curricula, in the form of other academic qualifications or
professional experiences.
More than half of the examined members come to the Court of Justice after a career experience in their
national judiciary, often at the highest level (Constitutional Court, Highest Court, or Administrative Highest
Court). A relative minority instead performed some legal practice, either in ordinary courts or
administrative tribunals.
Table 1
The examination of the main careers of the members suggests a balance between Judiciary, Academe and
Public Administration, with a moderate prevalence of the latter. Only a minority has been shaped by legal
practice. It is interesting to note that a sizeable share of the sample has some background or experience in
MAIN BACKGROUND Number Percentage
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 15 33%
JUDICIARY 14 31%
ACADEMIC 13 29%
LEGAL PRACTICE 3 7%
45
PROVENANCE Number Percentage
ECHR 7 25%
TRIBUNAL EU (prev.CFI) 6 21%
REFERENDAIRE 4 14%
COMMISSION 3 11%
DELEGATIONS 2 7%
ADVOCATE GENERAL 2 7%
COMM. VENICE 2 7%
COUNCIL 1 4%
PARLIAMENT 1 4%
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economic matters. This is consistent with the findings of previous research on the Court's membership.105
In fact, starting with the famous Jacques Rueff,106 economic expertise seems to remain stable among
members of the ECJ.
As anticipated, although our data is limited to the Court's member involved in copyright cases, the size of
the sample gives an indication of the general composition of the Court. Our findings appear to be in line
with older research. It seems that the prevalence of academic, judiciary and public administration
background still holds, despite considerable enlargement of the EU and despite the resulting growing
membership of the Court. What is most interesting is that a European/Public legal background and strong
linguistic skills are still paramount within the Court, while specialized subject-matters such as for example
employment law and intellectual property law could not be identified in any of the examined professional
profiles.
A substantial difference registered by a comparison of our analysis with previous research relates to the
'circulation' between international/European courts and other European institutions. The provenance from
the European Court of Human Rights or from other European institutions seems to be more relevant now
than in the past. This is arguably due the increasing number of courts, of courts' members, and more
generally of personnel within the EU institutions. An arguable consequence of this ‘internal circulation’ can
be that professional backgrounds remain anchored to EU/Public administration competences as opposed to
the specialised competences that would be more in line with the current jurisdiction of the Court.
In conclusion, the analysis shows that the composition of the Court did not dramatically change from its
inception, and it is still mainly formed by high ranking professional often combining an academic career
with jurisdictional practice and governmental appointments. These preliminary findings suggest that
concerns about the independence of the Court have not substantially been addressed by the reform of the
105 Kelley n 86 above, 107.
106 Jacques Rueff (1896-1978) French Prime Minister and Minister of Finances, among other government
appointments and a brilliant academic career in economics and finance, was a member of the ECJ (formerly ECSC)
from 1952 to 1962.
Statutes of the Court, as the profiles of former public administrators are still dominant among the judges.107
However, the most specific finding of our study relates to the number and variety of legal skills that the
Court can use. Relevant gaps have been identified by the analysis of the areas of legal expertise within the
Court, including but not limited to copyright law.
A comparison between these findings and the findings of the previous section shows that there is no
apparent relationship between the assignment of copyright cases to specific Reporting Judges or Advocate
General, because not one of the examined profiles indicates a particular expertise in copyright law. Judge
Malenowsky, for example, who is the Reporting Judge in most copyright cases is a university professor of
International, European, and Public Law, and also a judge of the Constitutional Court, who worked for his
national Ministry of Foreign affairs and was sent to the EU Council in this capacity (he was President of the
Committee of Ministers' Deputies) before being appointed as a judge of the ECJ. Judge Lenaertz was also a
professor of Public and European law who comes from the Court of the First Instance of the EU, whereas
judge Arestis was mainly a judge in his native country. Among most recurring AGs in copyright cases,
Eleonor Sharpston has a background in economics, language and law. She is a barrister and has been an
academic in EC and comparative law and she was legal secretary (référendaire) at the ECJ before becoming
judge. AG Verica Trstenjak instead, who left the court in 2012, is a Private Law professor who covered high
posts within her home government before being appointed as a member of the Court.
As we see, nothing in the background of these court members indicates the reason why they have been
selected to cover copyright cases. The recurrence of the Reporting Judges and of the AGs seems therefore
inspired by other considerations than their previous professional background.
107 The Comité 255 is active only since 2010. Further research is therefore needed to ascertain this point.
The legal approaches of the ECJ
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice has been object of commentary by a relevant body of
literature, among which copyright commentators.108 However, the main focus of the analysis has been on
the juridical substance of the Court's decisions, rather than on the legal approaches privileged by the Court
in its reasoning. The legal techniques of the Court have however been analysed in the framework of
European governance, where some reasons for concern have emerged. The lack of reasoning in the
grounds of judgement, for example, or insufficient reasoning, has been criticised.109 Moreover, the Court
has often been accused of judicial activism, over-reaching its powers, and resulting in controversial
rulings.110
Among the minority of scholars who have devoted specific attention to the legal arguments employed by
the European Court in their context of justification, Joxerramon Bengoetxea deserves close attention.111
108 See for example M. van Eechoud, ‘Along the Road to Uniformity —Diverse Readings of the Court of Justice
Judgments on Copyright Work’ (2012) JIPITEC 1. Also J. Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of
Justice, the right to property and European copyright law’ (2013) 1 ELRev 65; and J. Griffiths, ‘Dematerialization,
Pragmatism and the European Copyright Revolution’ (2013) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, forthcoming; Queen
Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 156/2013. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2291502 (accessed 12 December 2013)
109 E. Muir, M. Dawson and B. de Witte, 'The European Court of justice as a Political Actor', in E. Muir, M. Dawson and
B. de Witte (eds) Judicial activism at the European Court of Justice (Cheltenam: Edgard Elgar 2013), 3. Also M.
Dawson, 'The political face of judicial activism: Europe's law-politics imbalance', in the same volume, 19. Also A.
Arnull 'Judicial activism and the European court of justice: how should academics respond?', in the same volume,
231.
110 For a definition of judicial activism see K. Kmiec, 'The Origin and Current Meaning of “judicial Activism”' (2004) 92
California Law Review 1441-1451. For judicial activism related to the ECJ see Arnull, ibid, 215. The judicial activism
of the Court has been imputed to the lack of dialogue between the European Political power and the jurisdictional
power. See Hatzopoulos, n 1 above, 139.
111 Bengoetxea n 24 above.
Crucially to our discourse, he provided the first systematic analysis of the legal approaches implemented by
the Court. To this end, he examined decisions of the Court in which the methodology implemented for the
interpretation of the law was expressly discussed by the judges, and decisions in which the Court clearly
employed a given approach, without explicitly justifying it.
Bengoetxea finds that the European Court adopts by and large the same topoi of legal interpretation that
are recognised by the most advanced legal systems, and that can be summarised in linguistic or semiotic
arguments, contextual or systematic arguments, and teleological or dynamic arguments. Among the
dynamic arguments Bengoetxea includes the use of topoi peculiar to the European legal framework, such
as the uniform application of EU law, the effet utile, the principle of supremacy, the direct effect, the
principle of proportionality, etc.112 Finally, in the absence of an exhaustive normative system it becomes
important for the Court to recur to its own case-law both as a topos and as a normative source.113
More recently, another exhaustive review of the legal approaches employed by the European Court has
been carried out by Gunnar Beck. As Bengoetxea, he finds that by and large the legal arguments or topoi
employed by the ECJ in its legal reasoning coincide with those recognised by most advanced legal systems.
He critically assesses the choices of the Court in matter of legal interpretation and tests the criticisms
according to which the European judges cumulatively use a number of legal approaches, without a
hierarchical order. In essence, he finds that on the one hand the occurrence of a cumulative attitude of the
Court is mostly justified, and on the other hand the impact of this approach on the jurisprudence of the
Court should not be exaggerated.114
112 Bengoetxea n 24 above, 218. See also Beck, n 24 above, 187.
113 One of the topoi employed by the Court in its interpretative technique is the recognition of its own previous
case-law. Recognition and examination of previous case law is important in the court reasoning. Although the
Court is not bound by its precedents as in the common law system, it is compelled to seriously consider its
previous case law by the need for stability and legitimacy. See Beck n 24 above, 274.
114 ibid, 439.
The cumulative method of the Court represents a departure from the three-step approach theorized by
McCormick and Summers.115 According to their theory, courts should address legal cases in three steps.
The first step involves an exam of the text of the law in search of a legal meaning that clearly applies to the
factual situation (semiotic argument). This legal analysis involves to some extent contextual analysis,
intended as the analysis of the literal context in which the letter of the law is framed. In the case of EU
directives, for example, this would involve an analysis of the recitals of the directive, in order to provide
clarifications on the meaning of the text. This is mostly sufficient in the grounds for judgement when a case
is clear.116 But for most cases, when the text of the law does not suffice to provide a solution, other
arguments have to be called upon.
Step two therefore involves a systematic or contextual interpretation, which goes beyond the semantic
context of the legal text. Historical considerations (for example, preparatory works for a directive),
economic considerations (for example, advantages or disadvantages for the internal market), contextual
legislative frameworks (for example other directives, international treaties, fundamental principles of law)
are called into play. Step three, finally, involves a purposive or teleological reading of the law, which takes
into account the intention of the legislator, as deduced from the above sources. Step three is seen by some
as a potentially risky approach because involves a larger amount of discretion by the judge. Therefore,
115 See generally McCormick D.N. and Summers R. Interpreting Statutes: a Comparative Study (Dartmouth: Aldershot
1991).
116 Bengoetxea n 24 at 171. Bengoetxea makes a distinction between clear cases and difficult cases submitted to the
Court. In clear cases only simple justifications are required and provided by the Court. This means that a specific
norm, whose meaning is not controversial, apply to a given factual situation. For difficult cases, conversely, more
complex justifications are needed. Among the more sophisticated justifications, we find, for example: a)
consistence with precedent binding law (treaties, directives); b) consistence with general principles of law (ex. Ne
bis in idem, lex specialis derogat lex generali, etc.); c) consequent reasoning (ex. a fortiori, a contrario), showing
that the chosen solution is preferable to the alternatives; d) etc. Clear cases are currently addressed by the Court
by Court Order, in which they generally refer to a previous ruling of the Court. Difficult cases are the most
important source of European jurisprudence, and they are able to shape the details of EU law.
according to these commentators, step three should be called into play only when the first two steps did
not help with the interpretation of the legal text.117
Critics of the cumulative approach of the Court in essence reproach the European judiciary to favour
purposive interpretation over semantic techniques in order to foster European integration.118 Beck admits
this attitude of the Court, but he argues that this ‘communautaire flavour’ find its origin not only in the
Courts judicial activism but also in the legal uncertainty of European law.119 Moreover, he argues, the
occurrence of such attitude in the European jurisprudence is not evenly employed but depends on subject
areas.120
Finally, Beck admits that the legal reasoning of the Court is less constrained than that of other high courts,
but he ascribes this to the peculiar nature of the European judiciary. On the one hand a multilingual and
multi-governmental legal system offers more uncertainty over literal interpretations and historical
interpretations (instrumental to understand the ‘intention’ of the legislator’121); and on the other hand, as
117 Beck n 24 above, 279.
118 Rasmussen n 4 above, 29-33; P. Neill, The European Court of justice: A Case Study in judicial Activism (London:
European Policy Forum,1995), 47. However, this argument is challenged by Beck n 24 above, 285. Beck
acknowledges that the ECJ Court accords less presumptive importance to linguistic argument than other supreme
courts, but he argues that the impact of this factor on the quality of the jurisprudence of the Court should not be
exaggerated.
119 Beck n 24 above, 439. On the same position, see generally T. Tridimas, 'The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism',
[1996] 21(3) European Law Review 199-210, arguing that not all ruling of the EU court of Justice are innovative
(many practice some form of self-restraint) and the teleological approach often utilised by the Court is imposed by
its constitutional role conferred by the treaties. See also Arnull n 22 above, 618 and Arnull n 109 above, 224. See
also Beck n 24 above, 235. However, Beck's findings are not uncontroversial. Others have argued that the
peculiar characteristics of the EU legal system do not justify the departure from traditional legal interpretation. See
Conway 2013 n 3 above, 273.
120 Beck n 24 above, 313.
121 The text of the Treaties is inherently vague, and it represents a pluralism of values. This for example is one source
in most legal systems, there is no hierarchical order of the topoi122 to be employed in the legal
justifications, hence the relevant amount of discretion that the Court enjoys in its reasoning.123 This is how
other extra-legal ‘steadying factors’ enter the determination of the Court's judgements. While the topoi
relate to the context of justification of a judgement, the ‘steadying factors’ relate to the context of
discovery. These are political, social, psychological factors that impact on the decision, because they
ultimately determine the weight that is given to each topos, and are much more volatile and difficult to
assess.124
Our work aims to identify specific patterns in the Court's legal approaches, using copyright case law as the
‘site’. To this end, standard canons of legal interpretation, classified in semantic, systemic, and teleological,
are empirically quantified in our study by each textual occurrence suggesting the implementation of a given
legal technique. The content analysis has produced variables that, through statistical analysis, capture the
prevailing approaches of the Court and predict relationships between these and the outcome of the case.
of leeway for the legal reasoning of the Court. Beck n 24 above, 235-237
122 These are interpretative arguments that the Courts use in their legal reasoning. The CJEU courts uses by and large
the same topoi than other courts worldwide: reference to general principles of law, purposive (teleological, effet
utile), comparative, historic (intention of the legislator), logic (a contrario, a fortiori, ad absurdum), reference to
principles of law (lex specialis, lex superior) etc. However, some of the systemic and purposive topoi are specific to
EU Law (for example, the effet utile). Beck 2013 n 24 at 230. Also Bengoetxea n 24 above at 254. The lack of
hierarchy in the Court's legal approaches is confirmed by the analysis of Arnull n 22 above, 617.
123 Beck n 24 above, 278. For a contrasting position, arguing that literal topoi should precede systematic arguments,
and that purposive topoi should be used only when the previous two are insufficient. See McCormick and
Summers n 115 above.
124 Beck n 24 above, 435.
Analysis and findings
Semantic, Systematic or Teleological?
In each case before the Court of Justice, discussion starts with a reference to the letter of the relevant
legislation. In fact, the Court has expressly declared the importance of this approach by stating that the
judges cannot 'interpret a provision in a manner contrary to its express wording'.125 The semantic approach
therefore occurs in all cases of the sample. The content analysis also codes references to the recitals of the
cited directives, which we consider as part of the semantic approach because they are instrumental to
clarifying the text of the law. However, if the text of the recitals suggested an wider approach, the recitals
were coded accordingly.126 Evidence of a semantic approach was indicated by references to particular
words or expressions, for example in their different linguistic translation, or accompanied by a discussion
on differences in meaning. This evidence was considered in relation to other approaches in order to
determine its significance.
‘Systematic’ (or ‘contextual’) coding was applied whenever one or more contextual factors were called into
play to support a given interpretation of a piece of European legislation. In these cases reference was made
for example to international legislation, to the legislative history of the legal text, to other EU legislation
(normally EU directives), to legal philosophy arguments, or to economic factors (impact on competition or
on the internal market). The ‘systematic’ code was also applied to logical arguments (a contrario, a fortiori,
125 C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council [2000] ECR 08419 (83). Cited by Beck n 24 above, 188.
126 Other researchers have classified recitals as ‘systematic’, because they belong to a contextual interpretation of the
law (Beck n 24 above, 191); However, we have distinguished between semiotic/contextual (which we have coded
as ‘semiotic’, and broadly contextual, which in our analysis refers to historical, philosophical, economical context,
or reference to international treaties or other directives. For the function of Recitals as mere clarification of the
text of the law see the Joint practical guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/techleg/10.htm (last accessed 5 January 2014):'10. The purpose of the recitals is to
set out concise reasons for the chief provisions of the enacting terms, without reproducing or paraphrasing them.
They shall not contain normative provisions or political exhortations.'
a pari, by analogy) and hierarchical arguments (lex specialis, lex generalis, etc.) traditionally utilised in legal
reasoning, because these arguments are normally recalled with reference to other legal sources (law or
case law), which are part of the context in which the piece of EU legislation is examined.127
The analysis shows that the recourse to systematic/contextual arguments was made by Advocate Generals
much more often than by judges in the Grounds for Judgement. Mostly the reference was made to the
legislative history of the examined piece of legislation (e.g. preparatory works of directives). However, very
often the legal interpretation of European law was underpinned by the norms of international treaties
(TRIPS, Berne convention, WTO Treaties, HR Convention and Charter). Less frequently, the examined cases
included reference to other EU directives or to economic considerations (favourable or unfavourable
impact on the Internal Market). Philosophical considerations in our sample were rare.
A tentative explanation for this prevalence of systematic arguments in the Opinions compared to the
Judgements can be suggested by the institutional role of the Advocate General, who is charged to provide
the most comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the case.128
‘Teleological’ or purposive coding refers to dynamic129 approaches where the Court textually refers to the
aim or objective (or equivalent wording) of the piece of EU legislation that it is called to interpret. For
example wording such as: ‘First of all, it is to be noted that the principal objective of Directive ... is to
establish...’or ‘it is clear ... that the legislature intended...’ will be coded as ‘teleological’. Teleological
justifications were mostly recalled in order to assist in the interpretation of European directives, but in a
few occurrences they were also employed to explain the reference to international treaties and to
international sources of Human Rights law.130
127 This classification was implemented by Bengoetxea n 24 above, 240.
128 Burrows and Greaves, n 39 above, 297.
129 Bengoetxea n 24 above, 251.
130 C-393/09 - Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace [2007] ECR I- 4887 , Judgement, 30; C-431/09 - Airfield and Canal
Digitaal [2012] ECDR 3, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 50; C-5/08 - Infopaq International [2009] ECR I-6569, Judgement,
32; C-403/08 - Football Association Premier League and Others and C429/08 Murphy [2011] ECR I-09083 , Opinion
In addition, we have applied the ‘teleological’ code to parts of text in which the Court implemented specific
approaches peculiar to the EU system such as the effet utile doctrine, the proportionality principle, the
uniform application of the EU law, etc.131 Peculiar EU approaches seem to belong in the teleological
(dynamic) coding more than traditional and ‘orthodox’ interpretative techniques.
A large majority (87 per cent) of the judgements referred to the aim of the legislator while arguing for a
particular legal interpretation of the text. This figure includes also the peculiar approaches of European law,
which are however much less frequent than the references to the objective of the legislation.132 It is
important to note that teleological/dynamic justifications are normally summoned in addition to semantic
considerations, and often in addition to systematic/contextual justifications. Interestingly, Advocate
Generals recalled the intention of the legislator more often than judges in their rulings, although the
asymmetry between Opinions and Judgements is here less evident than in the use of systematic
arguments. Again, this asymmetry could be ascribed to the fact that the Advocate General provides a more
comprehensive analysis of the case.
The balance among semiotic, contextual and teleological argument therefore reveals a prevalence of
semantic and teleological approaches over contextual approaches, more evident in the Judgements than in
the Opinions. This balance, moreover, did not suffer extreme variations over the years, neither in the
Grounds for Judgement or in the Opinions of the Advocate Generals. Importantly, one occurrence was
detected of an explicit argument assessing one of these approaches against the other. In DR, the
Judgement specifies ‘a purely literal interpretation of the recital at issue does not, in itself, provide an
answer to the question referred since it inevitably results in an outcome which proves to be contra
of AG Kokott, 120.
131 ibid.
132 More in detail, we have found one reference to the ‘effet utile’ doctrine, in C-462/09 - Stichting de Thuiskopie
[2011] ECR I-05331, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, « The effet utile of Articles 2 and 5(2) of Directive 2001/29 could not
otherwise be achieved». (25) Moreover, we have found few references to the uniform application of the law (six
cases) and to the proportionality principle (five cases).
legem’.133 The teleological interpretation of the legal text was therefore explicitly preferred to the semantic
interpretation. The aim of the legislator, in DR, was also called into play to settle the contrast among
diverging translations of the directive.134 However, these are overall exceptional findings in the sample.
Mostly, the text of the examined legal cases revealed an implementation of several combined approaches
(semantic, systematic and teleological), supporting each other.
Reversing vs Consolidating previous Case-Law
Reference to European case law is undoubtedly a very important canon of interpretation implemented by
the European Court. This is normally ascribed to the indeterminate and fragmentary nature of European
law. Both the above-mentioned studies on the European jurisprudence have recognised the important
weight of this interpretative topos in the approaches of the Court.135 Our analysis confirms these findings.
In most of the cases examined, both within the Grounds of Judgement or the Opinion, reference was made
to at least a few instances of European previous case law. Some of these previous rulings were recalled to
confirm the position of the Court on a point that had already been discussed in another case. Other rulings
were cited in order to distinguish the factual situation from that of the previous case. ‘Reversal’ coding in
our analysis was applied to instances of open criticism and distance taken from the Court's previous case
law, whereas every other self-referencing of the Court, intended as citation of previous case law in support
of the legal reasoning, was coded as ‘consolidation’.
In order to give a ‘reversal’ coding to a case, we have been looking for evidence of an express change of
route of the Court. For example, the landmark case HAG II136 studied by EU intellectual property
133 C-510/10 – DR and TV2 Danmark [2013] ECR I-0000, Judgement, 43.
134 ibid, 45. See also ibid, the Opinion of AG Trstenjak, 40: «In my opinion, the numerical ratio of the language versions
containing the conjunctions in question (‘and’ or ‘or’ ) is as immaterial as differences of linguistic detail, the
determining factor being the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which they form a part.’
135 Beck n 24 above, 235ss. Bengoetxea n 24 above, 225.
136 C-10/89 SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG [1990] ECR 1-371.
commentators137 as the most obvious example of reversal of the ECJ jurisprudence (reversing HAG I138),
includes in its documents express statements of criticism of the previous case law, such as: ‘With the
benefit of hindsight, one can see there were in the previous case-law signs of an unduly negative attitude
to the value of trademarks’139 or ‘one might perhaps have expected to find in the Court’s judgment in HAG
I a detailed, convincing statement of the reasons that led it to give birth to this new principle of Community
law. But that is not the case.’140
In our sample, the Court cites on average almost seven other cases in each judgement. We found hardly
any case in which no reference141 was made to previous case law. At the other extreme, in one case 28
other cases were cited.142 The self-referencing attitude of the Court in copyright cases appears very strong,
with 312 previous cases of the ECJ cited within the 59 cases object of our study. Of these, only one instance
of ‘reversal’ was found, in an Opinion of an Advocate General which did not specifically pertain to copyright
law.
It was the Advocate General Trstenjak in Painer who argued: ‘In the light of the criticism of the Court’s
previous case-law, which I consider to be justified, I suggest that a slightly modified criterion be applied in
examining whether there is a sufficiently close connection for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Regulation No
44/2001’.143 This instance, albeit interesting, is not strictly applicable to our area of interest, as it does not
refer to copyright subject-matters. The content analysis of the documents object of our study, therefore,
did not reveal any explicitly expressed conflict in the Court's case law on copyright.
137 See for example A. Turk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Cheltenham: Elgar European Law 2010).
138 C- 192/73 Van Zuylen v HAG [1974] ECR 731.
139 C-10/89 SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG [1990] ECR 1-371, Opinion of AG Jacobs, 16.
140 ibid, 21.
141 The only occurrence in the copyright sample is represented by VG Wort: C-457/11 VG Wort [2013] ECR I-0000.
Another three cases are included in the sample on the Database sui generis Right.
142 C- 145/10 Painer [2011] ECDR 6.
143 C- 145/10 Painer [2011] ECDR 6. Opinion of AG Trstenjak, 86.
Broad vs Narrow concepts and broadening the rights of the copyright owner
In every examined preliminary ruling the discussion has normally involved the definition of key concepts,
such as for example ‘reproduction right’ or ‘international exhaustion’. These concepts in our content
analysis have been identified and coded as ‘broad’ or ‘narrow’ according to whether their scope has
broadened or narrowed following the interpretation of the Court. This analysis will give indications on the
approaches of the Court only when combined with the object of the legal issue to which the concept is
related. For example, the concept of ‘reproduction right’ can give useful indications on the approach of the
Court only if we consider that this is one of the main entitlements of the copyright owner. A broad
interpretation of such a concept would broaden the rights of the owner, whereas a narrow interpretation
of the same concept would somewhat constrain copyright protection. Conversely, a broad interpretation of
copyright limits and exceptions would constrain the entitlements of the owner, whereas a narrow
interpretation would reinforce them.
Conventional wisdom in the copyright literature suggests that the Court normally gives a broad
interpretation of the rights of the owners and a narrow interpretation of copyright exceptions and
limitations. This general approach on copyright is grounded on a number of Recitals of Directive
29/2001/EC144 (hereinafter, the InfoSoc Directive), which requires a ‘high level of protection to the author’
and narrow boundaries for copyright exceptions.145 Broad or narrow interpretation of concepts therefore
144 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 P.
0010 – 0019.
145 C- 607/11 ITV Broadcasting [2011] EWHC 2977 , Judgement, 20; C-277/10 – Luksan [2012] ECR I-0000, Judgement,
66; C- 145/10 Painer [2011] ECDR 6, Judgement, 107; C-462/09 - Stichting de Thuiskopie [2011] ECR 05331,
Judgement, 32; C-393/09 - Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace [2007] ECR I- 4887, Judgement, 54; C-5/08 -
Infopaq International [2009] ECR I-6569, Opinion, 57; C- 467/08 Padawan [2010] ECR I-10055, Opinion, 42;
C- 456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg (Cassina) [2008] ECR I-02731, Opinion, 33; C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR
I-00271, Judgement, 36; C-306/05 – SGAE [2006] ECR I-11519, Opinion of AG Sharpston, 33 and 43, and Judgement
36; C-60/98 Butterfly [1999] ECR I-03939, Opinion of AG Cosmas, 31.
should normally be grounded on the specific text of a directive146 and should therefore be determined by
the piece of legislation that the Court is called to interpret.
However the analysis of our data reveals quite a different picture. Only little more than half of the
examined judgements called to interpret the rights of the owner gave a broad interpretation, and only little
more than half of the rulings involving copyright limits displayed a narrow construct. In essence, the
analysis suggests that the strong protection of the copyright owner, or the narrow construction of copyright
limits, do not guide the approach of the Court on copyright as one might have expected.
This finding however must be understood in context, i.e. the nature of the main copyright issues discussed
in each case. Almost half of the examined cases involved a copyright issue stemming from the InfoSoc
Directive whereas the other half of the sample discussed entitlements of copyright owners related to
copyright, such as broadcasting rights, rental rights, and resale rights, copyright enforcement, software
protection and copyright term. The ‘high protection’ for the copyright owner is cited only by the Infosoc
directive. Therefore, a substantial difference could be expected between the protection of the author
under this directive and the protection of rightholders under the other directives. In fact, our data reveals
that the difference is quite small. The rights of the owner are expanded in 56 per cent of the cases
stemming from the InfoSoc directive and in 45 per cent of case stemming from the other directives. Nine
out of twelve cases discussing the rights of the owner under the InfoSoc directive were interpreted
broadly,147 while half of the cases regarding copyright exceptions and limits were construed narrowly.148
146 For example, the concept of « communication to the public » is given a broad interpretation based on the wording
of Recital 23 of the InfoSoc Directive. See for example C-306/05 - SGAE , Opinion of the AG Sharpston, 26 and the
Judgement, 26. See also C- 607/11 ITV Broadcasting [2013] ECR I-0000, Judgement, 20.
147 Three cases related to fair compensation (C- 431/09 VG Wort [2011] ECR I-09363; C-403/08 C-521/11 Amazon.com
[2013] ECR I-0000; C- 518/08 Stichting de Thuiskopie [2011] ECR 05331); one to distribution rights (C- 5/08 Donner
[2009] ECR I-06569); one to technological protection measures (C-355/12 Nintendo e.a. (not yet published)); and
four to communication to the public C- 393/09 ITV Broadcasting [2010] I-13971; C- 128/11 SGAE [2006] ECR
I-11519, C‑351/12 OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. (not yet available); C-466/12 
Across the whole sample, an interesting example is the concept of ‘communication to the public’. This
concept was indeed recalled under a number of circumstances related to copyright, to resale rights, and to
broadcasting rights. The data suggest that the European judges initially revealed a strict attitude in relation
to the concept of communication to the public, with relation to a retransmission of a radio signal in hotel
rooms. In SGAE the Court, against the opinion of Advocate General La Pergola, excluded the application of
the broadcasting directive and referred the case to national legislation. No other directive was in force at
the time to offer a solution of this case.149 A few years later, after the entry into force of the InfoSoc
directive, the Court gave another reading of the same factual case by giving a broad interpretation of the
concept of communication to the public. The Operational part of the Judgement in Egeda stated: ‘the
distribution of a signal by means of television sets by a hotel to customers staying in its rooms, whatever
technique is used to transmit the signal, constitutes communication to the public within the meaning of
Article 3(1) of that directive.’150 The judges also specified: ‘It follows from the 23rd recital in the preamble
to Directive 2001/29 that ‘communication to the public’ must be interpreted broadly’.151
Svensson and others (not yet available)). Narrow interpretation was given to four cases related to the
communication to the public (C-467/08 Circul Globus Bucureşti [2010] ECR I-10055; C- 456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg
[2008] I-02731; C-403/08 - Football Association Premier League and Others and C429/08 Murphy [2011] ECR
I-09083; C-457/11 SCF v. Del Corso (not yet available)); and one case related to fair compensation (C- 240/07
Padawan [2010] ECR I-10055).
148 The exception for quotation and judiciary proceedings (Art 5.2(d,e))( C- 461/10 Painer [2011] ECDR 6); the
exception of transient reproduction (Art 5.1)(C- 168/09 Infopaq International [2009] ECR I-6569); and of the
international exhaustion of copyright (Art. 4.2) (C- 462/09 Laserdisken [2011] ECR I-05331). A broad interpretation
instead was given to the concept of ‘own facilities’ related to the exception of ephemeral recording for
broadcasting organizations (Art 5.2(d)) (C- 271/10 DR and TV2 Danmark (not yet available)); to the concept of
transient reproduction (C-403/08 - Football Association Premier League and Others and C429/08 Murphy [2011]
ECR I-09083); and to community exhaustion (C-61/97 FDV v. Laserdisken [1998] ECR I-05171)
149 C- 128/11 SGAE (not yet available).
150 C- 360/10 Egeda (not yet available), Judgement, 55.1.
151 ibid, Judgement at 36.
This approach was also followed with reference to a retransmission of a TV signal from one Member State
to another152 and in relation to the broadcasting of a TV signal in a pub.153 However, the Court appears to
change this attitude when ruling again on the retransmission of a radio signal in a dentist practice.154 It
reverses again this attitude when ruling on the retransmission on a signal in hotel rooms, by applying a
broad construct. 155 Further the European Court inverts again this approach when ruling on the
communication of a work in a place open to the public, by adopting a narrow stance.156 Finally, the broad
approach reappears when the judges rule on the retransmission of TV shows via the Internet157 and on the
broadcasting of TV signals in spa hotel rooms,158 only to disappear again on internet links on a web page.159
What is interesting to note is that the changes in the approach of the Court do not depend on whether or
not the communication rights stems from the InfoSoc Directive, and it does not depend on the legal
approaches applied to these cases either. According to our data, all the above cases are grounded on a
semantic interpretation of the law, confirmed by a teleological interpretation (in all cases) and by a
systematic interpretation (in most cases).
Finally, a certain consistency has to be reported on the approach used by the ECJ in cases regarding
copyright enforcement, software protection, and term protection, although the small size of the sample on
these subject-matters does not allow any conclusive findings. In the matter of enforcement, four cases are
included in our sample. In two cases the rightholder has asked the Court to approve, by preliminary ruling,
the imposition of filtering devices to Internet Service Providers in order to detect copyright infringement. In
these two cases the Court refused to give a positive answer underpinning its arguments with the protection
152 C-431/09 - Airfield and Canal Digitaal [2012] ECDR 3.
153 C-403/08 - Football Association Premier League and Others joint with C-429/08 Murphy [2011] ECR I-09083.
154 C-457/11 SCF v. Del Corso ( not yet available).
155 C- 607/11 Phonographic Performance (not yet available).
156 C- 283/10 Circul Globus Bucureşti [2010] ECR I-10055.
157 C- 607/11 ITV Broadcasting [2010] I-13971.
158 C‑351/12 OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. (not yet available).
159 C-466/12 Svensson and others (not yet available).
of fundamental rights.160 In another two cases, although not excluding the possibility for a national court to
issue an order to release personal data in civil proceedings for copyright infringement, the Court invited the
national judiciary to balance the interests at stake with fundamental rights (protection of personal data and
privacy) and to respect the principle of proportionality.161 The protection of fundamental rights in relation
to copyright users therefore seems to find unchallenged shelter under the aegis of the Court.
On the matter of software, the sample presents three cases, relating respectively to the object of
protection, to the exception for decompilation, and to the exhaustion of rights. Here the attitude of the
Court seems to be somewhat opposite to what it is expected in the field of copyright protection. The right
of the owner (object of protection) relating to the graphic user interface of a computer software162 was
construed narrowly. Conversely, an exception to copyright (decompilation) 163 and a limitation
(exhaustion)164 were construed broadly.
On the copyright term, finally, the data included two examples of cases in which the copyright protection
was revived thanks to a number of EU directives. Although copyright term should be in principle a limit to
copyright protection, by limiting in time the entitlements of the copyright owners, several pieces of
legislation extending copyright protection, first to copyright than to related rights, have in practice
expanded the strength of copyright protection. On this subject the Court has implemented a broad
approach, by conferring copyright protection to works previously not protected165 (or no longer protected)
by copyright.166
160 C- 360/10 SABAM (not yet available); C- 70/10 Scarlet Extended (not yet available).
161 C- 461/10 Bonnier Audio (not yet available); C- 275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I-00271.
162 C- 393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace [2010] ECR I-13971.
163 C- 406/10 SAS Institute (not yet available).
164 C- 128/11 UsedSoft (not yet available).
165 C- 240/07 Sony Music Entertainment [2009] ECR I-00263.
166 C-60/98 Butterfly [1999] ECR I-03939.
The above findings in the matter of enforcement, software and copyright term can give only indications of
the approaches of the Court on a given subject matter, due to the small size of the sample.
Judges vs Advocate Generals
The analysis of forty cases related to copyright and related rights object of preliminary rulings of the
European Court of Justice revealed sometimes a contrast between the Opinions of the Advocates Generals
and the text of the Judgements. In seven of the examined cases the Advocate General interpreted the main
issue in a way contrasting to the interpretation of the Judges. When the judges had given a broad
interpretation to the main issue, the AG had proposed a narrow interpretation and vice versa. The
copyright issues on which these divergences took place are: communication to the public (three cases),
equitable remuneration for broadcasting (two cases), fair compensation (one case), and exhaustion relating
to software (one case). Interestingly, the combination of reporting judges and advocate generals, in these
seven cases, is always different. This is somewhat in contrast to the general picture provided by copyright
jurisprudence, which shows a recurrence of the presence of judge Malenovský as a reporting judge and the
Advocate Generals Trstenjak or Sharpston.167
In VG Wort, the reading of Article 5(2)(a) of Directive 2001/29/EC by Advocate General Sharpston diverged
with the interpretation of the Court because she found that 'reproduction on paper or any similar medium'
referred only to 'reproductions on analogue originals', whereas for the judges this wording referred also to
'reproductions effected using a printer and a personal computer'. The concept of reproduction was
therefore interpreted restrictively by AG Sharpston and broadly by the Court, although they both
implemented the same legal topoi (semantic, contextual and teleological) to reach their respective
conclusions. In Usedsoft, according to Advocate General Bot the subsequent purchaser of a computer
software cannot rely on the exhaustion of the distribution right of the owner, whereas the Court disagreed.
Both the AG and the Court argued for the same teleological interpretation of the principle of exhaustion,168
167 See above, Section 4.
168 Case C- 128/11 Usedsoft (not yet available), Opinion of AG Bot: «The aim of the principle of exhaustion ... is to
but they reached opposite conclusions. In Lagardére and SENA, two of the first cases related to
neighbouring rights, the Court and the AGs reached different conclusions on the equitable remuneration in
Rental and Lending Rights while both employing teleological arguments.169
On the apparently thorny issue of communication to the public, three cases are available with a contrast
between the opinion of the AG and the ruling of the Court. While Advocate General La Pergola in Egeda
tried to convince the Court, without success, that broadcasting a signal in hotel rooms amounted to a
‘communication to the public’,170 few years and a directive later (the InfoSoc Directive) AG Sharpston used
the same arguments, repeatedly citing La Pergola, to convince the judges of the same point, with a
different outcome.171
strike a balance between the necessary protection of intellectual property rights...and the requirements of the free
movement of goods (43). Judgement: the objective of the principle of the exhaustion of the right of distribution of
works protected by copyright is, in order to avoid partitioning of markets, to limit restrictions of the distribution of
those works...(62).
169 C-192/04 Lagardére Active Broadcast (not yet available) Opinion of AG Tizzano: « in such cases, it must be given
‘an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into
account the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (68)». C-192/04 Lagardére
Active Broadcast, Judgement: « it is clear from its wording and scheme that Directive 92/100 provides for minimal
harmonisation regarding rights related to copyright. Thus, it does not purport to detract, in particular, from the
principle of the territoriality of those rights, which is recognised in international law and also in the EC Treaty.
(46)». C-245/00 SENA, Judgement: «the concept of equitable remuneration, a concept which must, in the light of
the objectives of Directive 92/100, as specified in particular in the preamble thereto, be viewed as enabling a
proper balance to be achieved between the interests of performing artists and producers in obtaining
remuneration for the broadcast of a particular phonogram» (36). C-245/00 SENA, Opinion of AG Tizzano: «it seems
to me to be immediately clear that remuneration cannot be considered to be equitable if it is likely to prejudice
the outcome sought by the Directive», (46).
170 C-293/98 Egeda (not yet available), Opinion of AG La Pergola.
171 C-306/05 SGAE (not yet available), Opinion of AG Sharpston: «As Advocate General La Pergola put it in his Opinion
in EGEDA, (54)‘[I]t is all too clear – given that such retransmission is not just a technical means to ensure or
Another divergence between AGs and judges is revealed by the analysis of the joint cases Football
Association and Murphy, where both Opinion and Judgement reached the same result, by allowing Ms
Murphy to use a Greek card in a British decoder, through two diverging tortuous paths.172 While both AG
and Court gave a broad construction of the concept of 'reproduction',173 AG Kokott did not see in the
factual situation a 'communication to the public'174 or an act of 'transient reproduction',175 whereas the
Court did.176 Both appealed to teleological, systematic, and semantic arguments to prove their points.
Finally, the broadcasting of a radio signal in a dentist practice was not considered an act of communication
to the public in SCF, despite the efforts of AG Trstenjak, who utilised the argument of the 'spirit and
improve reception of the original broadcast in the catchment area, as in the case, for example, of the installation
and use of transceivers – that [the hotel proprietor] gave the hotel guests access to the protected work.'».(52)
172 C-403/08 - Football Association Premier League and Others joint with C429/08 Murphy [2011] ECR I-09083.
173 ibid, Judgement: «the reproduction right extends to transient fragments of the works within the memory of a
satellite decoder and on a television screen» (159); ibid, Opinion of AG Kokott : «Acts of reproduction occur where
frames of digital video and audio are created within the memory of a decoder, as those frames constitute part of
the broadcast authors own intellectual creation. (252,3(b);’The display of a broadcast on a screen also constitutes
reproduction.»(252.3(c)
174 ibid, Opinion of AG Kokott: ‘A copyright work is not communicated to the public by wire or wireless means, within
the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, where it is received or viewed as part of a satellite broadcast at
commercial premises (for example, a bar)’(252.5).
175 ibid,Opinion of AG Kokott : «Transient copies of a work created on a television screen linked to the decoder box
have independent economic significance within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29 » (252 .4).
176 ibid, Judgement:’‘Communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 must be
interpreted as covering transmission of the broadcast works, via a television screen and speakers, to the customers
present in a public house. (211.7). Acts of reproduction such as those at issue in Case C-403/08, which are
performed within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a television screen, fulfil the conditions laid down in
Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29 and may therefore be carried out without the authorisation of the copyright
holders concerned.’ (211.6).
purpose' of directive 2006/115/EC177 to support broad protection for right holders, while the Court
distinguished between the objectives of this directive and the objectives of the InfoSoc directive to argue
for a narrow construct of the concept of communication to the public.178 Overall, the data shows a
marginally stronger engagement of the Advocate Generals in the defence of the rights of the owner,
translating into broad construction of rights and narrow construction of exceptions, compared to the
attitude of the Court.
Court members and their approach
Judge Jiri Malenovský was the reporting judge in 25 of the 40 cases relating to copyright and related
subject-matters (excluding database). It is interesting therefore to compare his approach to that of the
other reporting judges. The data show interesting findings in this respect. Judge Malenovský seems to
broaden the rights of the owner much more sparingly than his colleagues, by applying comparatively less
often a broad interpretation of the rights and a narrow interpretation of the exceptions. The data suggest
that he makes less use of teleological interpretation compared to the others and substantially more use of
systematic approaches. Other judges such as Arestis and Puissochet clearly show higher favour towards
rightholders, although they use different arguments, prompted by different case subject-matters. Judge
Arestis often argues for free competition, because half of his cases relate to software, whereas Judge
Puissochet, who was in post before the InfoSoc directive entered in force, mostly argue for harmonization
of European law. In essence, therefore, judge Malenovský shows a more conservative attitude in the legal
interpretation of copyright law while containing the rights of the owner within reasonable boundaries. At
177 ibid, Opinion of AG Kokott: ‘Furthermore, according to the spirit and purpose of Directive 2006/115, it would
appear to be sufficient if the customer has the legal and practical possibility of enjoying the phonograms.’ (33).
178 C-135/10 - SCF (not yet available) Judgement: ‘It is clear from a comparison of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 and
Article 8(2) of Directive 92/100 that the concept of communication to the public appearing in those provisions is
used in contexts which are not the same and pursue objectives which, while similar, are none the less different to
some extent.’ (74).
the same time, he shows the same recurrence of disagreement with Advocate Generals compared to his
colleagues.
Among the Advocate Generals, it is interesting to note that the two prevailing members in copyright cases,
AG Tristenjak and AG Sharpston have a surprisingly similar approach. They both (and to the same extent)
tend to favour the rightholder more sparingly than their colleagues and they both implement (to the same
extent) the argument of the ‘high protection’ for the author more often than their colleagues. Among the
latter, at least two deserve to be cited: AG Jaaskinen who has advised in favour of rightholders in all his
cases, and AG Bot who consistently expressed opinions against the rightholder in his software-related
cases. The first used arguments for free competition, overcoming legal uncertainty, and high protection of
the author, to the same extent. The second argued for competition, harmonization and, to a less extent,
fair balance of rights. Overall, the data seem to suggest that the favour for the rightholder is inversely
proportional to the experience in copyright matters matured by each member.
Database rights
Within the framework of our study, a separate dataset was collected including nine cases relating to the sui
generis database rights,179 which was examined with the same approach applied to copyright case-law. The
sample was analysed separately in order to avoid distortions of the findings caused by a type of entitlement
(the sui generis rights) which, albeit closely related to copyright, retains its own characteristics and
peculiarities.
Cases on the sui generis rights discuss mostly the scope of database protection, including the definition of
concepts such as 'extraction', 're-utilization', 'investment' and 'substantial part'. A few differences can be
detected between the approaches to database rights and to copyright. First, there is hardly any reference
in the ruling to the history of the legislation, whereas in all examined cases there is a reference to the
179 Two cases presented overlapping between copyright and database rights: C-5/08 Infopaq International and
C-545/07 Apis-Hristovich. Of these, the first presented as main issue a copyright issue and the latter presented as a
main issue a database issue. Therefore, the first was included in the copyright sample, and the latter in the
database sample.
objective of the legislation. Further, interpretation of the European law in the light of international
legislation seems to be much less recurrent in database cases than in copyright cases. Moreover, the
self-referencing of the Court, intended as the average of citations of previous European case law, is much
weaker in database case law than in copyright case law. Finally, a rather interesting finding reveals virtually
no conflict on database rights between the position of the judges and the opinion of the Advocate
General.180 Overall, the share of cases related to database protection that are ruled in favour of the owner
resembles the share of cases stemming from the InfoSoc Directive, and is therefore higher than the share
of pro-rightholder case law related to other directives.
In sum, differences in the implementation of the teleological approach of European judges between the
rights of the owner of a database and of copyright appear not relevant. On the contrary greater proximity
can be detected among approaches and outcome of the cases (pro rightholders) in database cases and in
copyright cases stemming from the InfoSoc directive, although the database directive does not require a
‘high protection’ for the owner.
Underpinnings of the legal approaches and impact on the decision
A breakdown of the teleological and systematic explanatory variables in sub-variables expressing the
arguments that the Court uses to underpin its approaches also produced interesting findings. Arguments
justifying a teleological interpretation of the law, when the outcome of the case did not favour the
copyright holder, involve mostly promoting a fair balance of rights between copyright holders and users (or
third parties). Other arguments used in cases ruled against the rightholder are, to a lesser extent: free
competition or free movements of goods in the Internal Market; fostering technological development;
harmonization of European law (often only ‘minimal harmonization’, which is a counterargument for
harmonization); and ‘adequate’ protection for the rightholder. To a further less extent, overcoming the
180 Only one case (C-338/02 Fixtures Marketing [2004] ECR I-10497) displayed a divergence between the conclusions
of the AG and the Operational part of the judgement. However, rather than a different stance on the same point,
the divergence is explained by the fact than AG and judges expressed two different points ('purpose of the
investment' and 'resources covered by the investment' on the same concept ('investment').
legal uncertainty in the Internal Market and promoting the circulation and development of culture were
also mentioned.
Unsurprisingly, a teleological interpretation of the Infosoc Directive based on a high protection for the
rightholder was found in more than one third of cases where the outcome favoured the owner of
copyright. The harmonization of European law was also called into action to rule in favour of the
rightholder, whereas the above mentioned arguments (competition, fair balance of rights, overcoming legal
uncertainty, and fostering technological development) were a minority.
Figure 2
These arguments, often literally drawn from the recitals of the interpreted directives (‘high protection’
from the 2001/29/EC directive, ‘fair balance’ from the 93/83/EC directive, ‘minimal harmonization’ from
the 92/100/EC directive, etc.) are to some extent merely rhetorical. In fact, almost all arguments are put
forward to underpin a teleological interpretation both in cases favourable and unfavourable to copyright
owners. However, the findings show a clear distinction between arguments ‘pro rightholder’ and
arguments ‘pro user’ (or anyway third party), the presence of which in the legal discourse of the Court
provides indications on the final outcome of the case.
Finally, the breakdown of the underpinnings of the systematic approach shows that the ECJ grounds its
decisions mainly on its own case law and, to a lesser extent, on international treaties, whereas historical
considerations, other directives and fundamental rights are much less decisive.
Conclusion
This study investigated empirically two theories in relation to the development of EU copyright law: (i) that
the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright
specific reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda
(resorting to teleological interpretation of European law rather than – less discretionary – semantic and
systematic legal approaches). On these matters, the study finds that: a) the lack of specific copyright
expertise of the European judges indeed holds back the formation of a coherent copyright jurisprudence,
and b) there is no upwards harmonizing agenda of the European Court overreaching beyond its institutional
role.
The members of the European Court of Justice are mainly ex-academics, civil servants, judges, or all of
these things. They have mostly a background in European Law or Public law. While some subject-specific
competences (criminal matters, family law, competition and commercial law) are slowly entering the
European Court, not all areas are covered. For example, there are no specialists in employment law and
copyright law, despite the increasing workload of the Court on these matters. This lack of specialization is
perhaps compensated by a subject-specific distribution of the workload among court members, enabling
‘judicial learning’.
Among the legal approaches applied by the Court, the analysis confirm a certain preference for teleological
and dynamic rather than systematic arguments,181 although the recourse to traditional topoi is far larger
than the implementation of peculiar European canons (effet utile, proportionality, etc.). However, overall
the data suggest a balance in the approach of the Court on copyright matters, in line perhaps with the ‘rule
181 Bengoetxea and Becks n 24 above.
of reason’ theorized by some commentators, which involves a balancing between the rights codified in
European law and community interests, in an attempt to develop both coherence and integration in the
European jurisdiction.182
On the entitlements of copyright owners and users, for example, the analysis provides a chiaroscuro of
broad and narrow interpretations of rights and exceptions, which reveals that the picture of European
copyright jurisprudence is complex, beyond traditional claims of copyright overprotection. Narrow
construction of the rights of the owner are at least as frequent as broad constructions, and they often occur
on similar copyright issues, or they are based on similar copyright arguments, such as the strong protection
of the author recommended in the preamble of the InfoSoc directive. The Court in fact seems to strive to
balance the latter principle with other considerations.
An analysis of the arguments used by the Court to justify their rulings, in the form of the ‘intention of the
legislator’ reveals interesting cues about what these other considerations might be. ‘Fair balance’ of rights
and interests is argued in many cases with an unfavourable outcome for the rightholder, together with free
competition, fostering technological development, ‘adequate’ protection of rightholder, and ‘minimal
harmonization’. Copyright harmonization is instead favoured by pro-rightholder rulings, surpassed only by
the ‘high protection for the author’. The data analysis shows a significant impact of the latter argument on
the outcome of the case, which is (with one exception only183) favourable to the rightholder.
A further difference in approach can be observed between copyright cases stemming from the InfoSoc
directive and cases on copyright-related rights (stemming from the other directives). While the first reveal a
higher probability of a favourable outcome for the rightholder (although maybe not as high as one could
expect), the second feature a higher predictability and consistency in the approach. For example, cases of
software protection or exhaustion of rights invariably prompt competition arguments (and are ruled
182 Bengoetxea, McCormick and Moral Soriano, n 30 above, 67.
183 C-466/12 Svensson and others (not yet available).
against the owner) whereas rental and lending rights are often solved by shifting the decision to Member
States, in the name of ‘minimal harmonization’.
However, on more nuanced issues such as the right of communication to the public or, more generally,
rights or exceptions stemming from the InfoSoc directive, approach patterns are more volatile. As the
recent rulings OSA and Svensson show, the same argument (high protection for the author) and the same
approach (teleological) on the same concept (communication to the public from the InfoSoc directive) can
lead to opposite outcomes. This suggests on the one hand that when the legislation is clearly formulated
the impact of subject-specific knowledge (or lack of it) on the ruling is contained. On the other hand it
might also suggest that when the subject-matter is more difficult to define, or more controversial,
subject-specific knowledge is essential. This is confirmed by the analysis of the relationships between the
approaches and court members. Those that have developed within the Court a relatively larger domain
expertise issue more balanced rulings or opinions, while developing a larger array of arguments. The
balance between copyright owners and users is in fact a more subtle but more important overarching
principle of copyright law than ‘high protection’ for rightholders.
Striving for balance is certainly an essential quality for a court. At least, the data clearly show that the ECJ is
not biased either towards or against rightholders, as its judgements so far are perfectly distributed
between the two outcomes. However, better legislative drafting and coherent specialist reasoning would
improve both the predictability and the credibility of the rulings of the Court. Our study suggests that the
introduction of specialised professionals within the Court is essential: this is the path of reform that the ECJ
should follow.
APPENDIX I – Codebook
List of codes used for content analysis
broad concept: broad interpretation of the main concept or issue that the court is called to interpret or
define
narrow concept: a narrow interpretation of the main concept or issue that the court is called to interpret or
define
semantic: text of the law interpreted according to its wording. This includes also the context of the
wording, as for example the recitals of a directive. In this sense, the word «context» is still related to the
textual analysis, whereas a larger contextualization of the norm would involve historical or economic
considerations.
systemic/contextual:
 interpretation in light of international treaties
 historical (legislative history of the legal text)
 economic (economic reasons for the provisions)
 philosophical (mention of legal philosophy arguments to interpret concepts)
 logic: analogy, a fortiori, a contrario
dynamic/teleological:
 interpretation according to the perceived purpose of the legislator
 approaches specific to the EU (effet utile, uniform application, stc.)
 reasonableness : a contrary interpretation would lead to an aberrant result
Examples of coding
C-466/12 Svensson
JUDGEMENT
Broad, teleological
As regards the first of those criteria, that is, the existence of an ‘act of communication’, this must be
construed broadly (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier
League and Others [2011] ECR I-9083, paragraph 193), in order to ensure, in accordance with, inter alia,
recitals 4 and 9 in the preamble to Directive 2001/29, a high level of protection for copyright holders (17)
Teleological
Recital 7 in the preamble to the directive indicates that the directive does not have the objective of
removing or preventing differences that do not adversely affect the functioning of the internal market (36)
C-351/12 OSA
OPINION
Broad, teleological
the expression must be interpreted broadly, in such a way as to ensure a high level of protection for right
holders (27)
JUDGEMENT
Broad
the concept of ‘communication to the public’ in Article 3(1) of that directive must be interpreted broadly,
as recital 23 in the preamble to the directive indeed expressly states (23)
Teleological
the principal objective of Directive 2001/29 is to establish a high level of protection of authors (23)
EU law
Questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context
which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to
determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (56)
C-355/12 Nintendo e.a.
OPINION
broad
On a proper construction of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society,
‘technological measures’ within the meaning of Article 6 of that directive may include measures
incorporated not only in protected works themselves but also in devices designed to allow access to those
works; (79,1)
JUDGEMENT
broad
the concept of an ‘effective technological measure’, for the purposes of Article 6(3) of that directive, is
capable of covering technological measures comprising, principally, equipping not only the housing system
containing the protected work, such as the videogame, with a recognition device in order to protect it
against acts not authorised by the holder of any copyright, but also portable equipment or consoles
intended to ensure access to those games and their use.
Teleological
Such a definition, moreover, complies with the principal objective of Directive 2001/29 which, as is
apparent from recital 9 thereof, is to establish a high level of protection in favour, in particular, of authors,
which is crucial to intellectual creation. (27)
EU/proportionality
the examination of that question requires that account be taken of the fact that legal protection against
acts not authorised by the rightholder of any copyright must respect the principle of proportionality, in
accordance with Article 6(2) of Directive 2001/29, interpreted in the light of recital 48 thereof, and should
not prohibit devices or activities which have a commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent the technical protection. (30)
systematic/lex specialis
Directive 2009/24 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to the provisions of Directive 2001/29
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on
IS
P
)
C
‑ 283/10
C
irculG
lobus
B
u
c
u
re
ş
ti 
Third
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
Trstenjak
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
5
01/29
C
om
m
unication
to
the
public
C
‑ 277/10
Luksan
Third
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Trstenjak
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
A
T
1
1
0
6
93/83
D
irector's
rights
C
‑ 162/10
P
honographic
P
erform
ance
Third
M
alenovský
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Trstenjak
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
IE
1
0
4
06/115
C
om
m
unication
to
the
public
C
‑ 145/10
P
ainer
Third
M
alenovský
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Trstenjak
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
A
T
0
28
01/29
E
xception
forquotation/judicialproceedings
C
‑ 135/10
S
C
F
Third
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
Trstenjak
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
IT
1
1
8
06/115
C
om
m
unication
to
the
public
(dentist)
C
‑ 70/10
S
carletE
xtended
Third
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
C
ruz
V
illalón
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
B
E
1
0
2
00/31
requestofpersonaldata
to
IS
P
C
‑ 271/10
V
E
W
A
Third
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Trstenjak
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
5
92/100
R
em
uneration
to
rightholder
C
‑ 461/10
B
onnierA
udio
Third
M
alenovský
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
Jääskinen
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
S
E
0
4
06/24
requestofpersonaldata
to
IS
P
C
‑ 168/09
Flos
S
econd
Lõhm
us
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
B
ot
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
IT
1
0
6
98/71
D
esign,tem
porary
exclusion
from
C
protection
C
‑ 462/09
S
tichting
de
Thuiskopie
Third
M
alenovský
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Jääskinen
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
N
L
0
1
01/29
Faircom
pensation
(private
copy)
C
‑ 393/09
B
e
z
p
e
č
n
o
s
tn
í 
softw
arová
asociace
Third
A
restis
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
B
ot
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
C
Z
0
7
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S
oftw
are,objectofprotection
(G
U
I)
C
‑ 431/09
A
irfield
and
C
anal
D
igitaal
Third
M
alenovský
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
Jääskinen
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
B
E
1
0
8
93/83
C
om
m
unication
to
the
public
(TV
retrasm
ission)
C
‑ 5/08
Infopaq
International
Fourth
M
alenovský
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
Trstenjak
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
D
K
0
4
01/29
R
eproduction,transient
C
-403/08
C
-429/08
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ssociation
P
rem
ierLeague
+
M
urphy
G
rand
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
K
okott
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
U
K
1
1
1
20
01/29
com
m
unication
to
the
public(R
eproduction,transient,illicitdevice)
C
-467/08
P
adaw
an
Third
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Trstenjak
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
E
S
1
1
0
16
01/29
Faircom
pensation
(private
copy)
C
‑ 518/08
Fundación
G
ala-
S
alvadorD
alí
Third
M
alenovský
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
S
harpston
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
FR
1
1
0
5
01/84
R
esale
R
ights
C
‑ 240/07
S
ony
M
usic
E
ntertainm
ent
G
rand
A
restis
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
R
uiz-Jarabo
C
olom
er
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
D
E
1
0
4
06/116
Term
ofprotection
C
‑ 456/06
P
eek
&
C
loppenburg
Fourth
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
S
harpston
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
D
E
1
0
5
01/29
D
istribution
right(exhaustion)
C
‑ 275/06
P
rom
usicae
G
rand
M
alenovský
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
K
okott
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
E
S
1
1
0
0
00/31
requestofpersonaldata
to
IS
P
C
-306/05
S
G
A
E
Third
M
alenovský
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
S
harpston
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
E
S
1
1
0
8
01/29
com
m
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to
the
public
(hotelroom
s)
C
-169/05
U
radex
Third
M
alenovský
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
R
uiz-Jarabo
C
olom
er
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
B
E
0
3
93/83
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society
pow
ers
C
-479/04
Laserdisken
G
rand
A
restis
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
S
harpston
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
D
K
1
0
7
01/29
Internationalexhaustion
ofdistribution
right
C
-192/04
Lagardère
A
ctive
B
roadcast
Third 
M
alenovský
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Tizzano
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
IT
1
1
2
93/83;92/100
broadcasting
equitable
rem
uneration
C
-245/00
S
E
N
A
S
ixth 
P
uissochet
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Tizzano
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
N
L
1
4
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equitable
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C
-293/98
E
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S
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K
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0
0
0
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0
0
1
0
0
0
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P
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1
0
0
0
0
0
0
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E
S
1
1
1
0
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m
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s)
C
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B
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M
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N
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P
uissochet
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0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
C
osm
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1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
IT
1
0
5
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Term
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(expanded-revival)
C
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FD
V
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N
one
P
uissochet
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
La
P
ergola
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
D
K
0
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92/100
C
om
m
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exhaustion
ofR
entalrights
C
-200/96
M
etronom
e
M
usik
N
one
P
uissochet
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Tesauro
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
D
E
0
14
92/100
R
entalright(contrastw
ith
freedom
ofenterprise)
C
-92/92
P
hilC
ollins
N
one
G
révisse
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Jacobs
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
D
E
0
9
92/100
N
on
D
iscrim
ination
20
8
5
1
7
9
4
2
4
37
29
7
1
4
3
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9
7
1
4
10
1
3
1
35
0
10
15
3
1
2
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3%
18%
23%
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5%
10%
93%
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18%
3%
10%
8%
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23%
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3%
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3%
8%
3%
88%
0%
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8%
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S
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S
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S
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i
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APPENDIX III – PROFILES
JUDGE
ACADEM
IC
BACKG
RO
UND
(studies
and
teaching)
ACADEM
IC
PRO
F.
JUDICIARY
(national)LEG
AL
PRACTICE
PUBLIC
SERVICE
EU
INSTIT
W
HICH
INST
ECO
NO
M
IC
BKG
R
M
AIN
BKG
R
J.M
alenovský
EU
Law ;InternationalLaw
1
1
0
1
1
(delegations)
JU
K.Lenaerts
EU
Law ;Public
Law
1
0
1
0
1
(REF,CFI)
AC
R.SilvadeLapuerta
EU
Law
0
0
1
1
1
(delegations)
PA
E.Juhász
Com
parative
Law,EU
Law 
0
0
1
1
0
1
PA
G.A
restis
Law
and
Policy
0
1
1
0
0
JU
T. von
Danwitz
Public
Law ;EU
Law
1
0
0
0
0
AC
D.Šváby
CivilLaw ;Fam
ily
Law ;trade
Law ;Hum
an
Rights ;ConstitutionalLaw
0
1
0
0
1
(ECHR
and
CFI)
JU
U.Lõhmus
Crim
inalLaw ;Hum
an
Rights ;ConstitutionalLaw
0
1
0
1
1
(echr)
JU
A
. Rosas
EU
Law ;InternationalLaw ;Hum
an
Rights ;ConstitutionalLaw,Public
Law
1
0
0
1
1
(Com
m
)
AC
A
.Borg
Barthet
CivilLaw ;Com
parative
Law
0
1
1
1
0
LAW
S.von
Bahr
Public
Law ;Tax
Law
0
1
0
1
0
1
PA
A
.Ó Caoimh
EU
Law :CivilLaw ;
1
1
1
0
0
LAW
L. Bay
Larsen
Law
and
Policy ;Public
Law ;Fam
ily
Law
0
1
1
1
1
(Europol)
PA
M
.Safjan
CivilLaw ;Ethics(m
edicallaw)EU
Law
1
1
0
0
0
AC
A
.A
rabadjiev
ConstitutionalLaw ;Hum
an
Rights ;EU
Law
1
0
0
1
1
(echr)
JU
J.-C. Bonichot
EU
Law ;Public
Law
1
1
0
1
1
(REF)
PA
G.Hirsch
ConstitutionalLaw ;EU
Law
0
1
0
0
0
JU
H.Ragnemalm
Public
Law 
1
0
0
1
0
AC
J. N.CunhaRodrigues
Hum
an
Rights ;Crim
inalLaw
0
1
1
1
1
(echr)
PA
J.L.daCruzVilaça
Econom
ics ;EU
Law ;Com
petition
Law ;Public
Law
1
0
1
1
1
(CFIand
AG
)
1
PA
C. Toader
CivilLaw ;ContractLaw ;
Private
InternationalLaw ;EU
Law
1
1
1
0
0
AC
E
. Jarašiūnas 
ConstitutionalLaw
1
1
0
1
1
(Venice)
JU
J.‑ P.Puissochet
Public
Law 
0
0
0
1
1
(Council)
1
PA
P. Lindh
Public
Law ;Trade
Law
0
1
0
1
1
(CFI)
PA
A
.Prechal
EU
Law
1
0
0
0
1
(REF)
AC
J. K
lu
čka 
InternationalLaw ;ConstitutionalLaw
1
1
0
1
1
(Venice)
JU
K. Schiemann
EU
Law ;Com
petition
Law ;Com
parative
Law
0
1
1
0
0
JU
A
.Tizzano
EU
Law
1
0
0
0
1
(AG
)
PA
G
rand
Cham
berO
nly
M
.Berger
Law
and
Econom
ics,Public
Law,Law
and
Policy
1
0
0
1
1
(Parl)
1
PA
E.Levits
Law
and
Policy,ConstitutionalLaw,Public
Law
1
0
0
1
1
(echr)
1
PA
J. M
akarczyk, 
Public
Law,EU
Law
Hum
an
Rights
1
0
0
1
1
(echr)
PA
J.-J.Kasel
Public
Law
0
1
1
1
(Com
m
)
PA
C.W
.A
.Timmermans
EU
Law
1
1
0
0
1
(Com
m
)
JU
M
. Ilešič 
CivilLaw ;trade
Law ;Private
InternationalLaw
1
1
0
0
0
AC
V.Skouris
ConstitutionalLaw ;Public
Law ;Law
and
Econom
ics
1
0
1
1
0
1
PA
AGV.Trstenjak
CivilLaw ;Com
parative
Law ;Private
InternationalLaw ;EU
Law
1
0
1
1
1
(CFI)
AC
E.Sharpston
Econom
ics;EU
Law ;Com
parative
Law
1
1
1
0
1
(REF)
1
AC
N. Jääskinen
EU
Law ;Public
Law
1
1
0
1
0
JU
Y.Bot
Crim
inalLaw
0
0
1
0
0
LAW
P. CruzVillalón
Law
and
Policy ;ConstitutionalLaw
1
1
0
0
0
JU
D.Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer
EU
Law ;Public
Law
1
1
0
1
1
(echr)
JU
J.Kokott
Public
Law,EU
Law
InternationalLaw
Business
Law
1
0
0
0
0
1
AC
A
.Tizzano
EU
Law 
0
0
0
0
0
AC
A
.LaPergola
ConstitutionalLaw :Public
Law
0
0
0
0
0
JU
P.M
engozzi
EU
Law ;Business
Law ;Trade
Law
1
0
0
1
1
(CFI)
AC
TO
TAL 
45
28
23
16
26
26
9
PERCENTAG
E
62%
51%
36%
58%
58%
20%
